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ABSTRACT 
 
This study will be on the anticipated impact of GATS on the Financial Services Industry 
in Africa. This paper will examine the possible positive and negative impact of the GATS 
agreement on the financial services industry in the African countries. The research will 
focus on the banking sector and the insurance sector as the main financial sectors under 
investigation.  A conclusion of the investigation will be whether the positive effects of 
GATS on the financial sector outweigh the negative effects or vice versa. The first 
chapter will give a general overview of GATS and the financial services trade 
liberalization negotiations. The second chapter will be a literature review on the impact of 
GATS on services in Africa. The chapter will then proceed to analyze the anticipated 
impact of GATS on the financial services industry in Africa. The third chapter will be a 
comparative analysis of the effects of GATS on the East Asian Countries as compared to 
the effects of GATS on the financial services industry in Africa. The research pays 
attention to the East Asian Financial crisis and analyses the contribution of the 
liberalization of the financial services industry to this crisis. This chapter then focuses on 
China’s efforts to liberalize its financial industry in accordance to GATS requirements 
and the precautions it has taken to ensure it does not go through a financial crisis like its 
neighbours did. The fourth chapter will critically analyse the anticipated impact of GATS 
on the financial services industry in Africa. A conclusion is drawn as to whether the 
overall impact will be positive or negative. Finally, chapter five gives the proposals that 
have been put forth by African countries so as to improve their position in the financial 
services trade liberalization negotiations. This chapter will also give recommendations on 
the position that the African countries should adopt when in the financial services trade 
liberalization negotiations; a position that will minimize negative impacts and maximize 
positive impacts.  
The methodology that will be used in this research will be analytical in nature. The 
researcher will gather data from previous research done on the subject of the paper and 
will analyse the same so as to come to logical conclusions to the stated research question. 
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1.0 CHAPTER 1
1.1 Introduction 
1.2 Background of the Problem 
1.2.1 A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF GATS 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of about 60 agreements and 
decisions reached at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the Multilateral trade 
negotiations (1986-1994) and signed in 1994. A key agreement among these was the 
agreement that established the WTO, a common institutional framework for the conduct 
of trade relations among members guided by the Uruguay Round. The organisation aims 
at promoting trade liberalization through a rule-based system founded on principles 
agreed upon by members. The WTO became the first global economic institution with 
capacity to legally enforce its agreements through the dispute settlement body with 
powers to authorise sanctions against violators.1
The General Agreement on Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
came into effect in 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. The key objective of GATS is to promote the progressive liberalization of 
trade in services as a means of achieving economic growth for all countries and the 
development of developing countries (Preamble of the GATS). It seeks to do this by 
applying to services trade the basic rules of the WTO, with the necessary modifications to 
take into account the specific features and sensitivities of trade in services. While trade in 
goods has been governed by international trade rules since the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into effect in 1948, such an institution had never 
governed trade in services until GATS came into force. The drive to liberalize trade in 
services is strongly supported by global corporations and their associations, notably the 
US Coalition of Services Industries (US CSI).2
                                                 
1 Mutume, G.  (2002). “ Trading Services: an opening or a noose? Africa puzzles over the implications of 
trade in Geneva.” Africa recovery Vol 16, No. !, April 2002.   
2 See 1 above 
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GATS covers trade in all “commercial services,” categorized by the WTO in 12 groups: 
Business (including professional and computer) services; Communication (postal, courier 
and telecommunication) services; Construction and engineering services; Distribution 
services; educational services; Environmental services; Financial (insurance and banking) 
services; Health services; and other services not included elsewhere. The only two 
services not covered by GATS are air transport (although there are moves to bring them 
into the agreement)3 and “services supplied in the exercise of government authority.” The 
latter are defined as those neither provided in competition with other suppliers nor on 
“commercial basis.” Unlike trade in goods, there is no harmonised system of 
classification for services and countries have a wide discretion.4  
In structure, GATS is complex, lacks clarity on some definitions (for example, 
“commercial service” and not more burdensome than necessary”) and limitations of its 
provisions, and its rules are still under development.5 It differs from most other WTO 
agreements in two major ways6
• It adopts a bottom-up or positive-list approach that allows countries to choose 
which sectors to liberalize, and the extent and speed of liberalization of the chosen 
sectors. In addition, countries are allowed to attach conditions (such as employment and 
technology transfer), which are necessary for promotion of growth and development, to 
their liberalization commitments. This makes GATS one of the best-designed WTO 
agreements, being both a trade and investment instrument.  
• Negotiations proceed through a process of requests of, and offers for liberalization 
of specific sectors. The requests and offers are then taken up by bilateral bargaining 
between the countries involved.  
                                                 
3 Ikiara M.M. (2003) “ The implications of GATS on Kenya’s Services Sector: Some Proposals on the 
Country’s Position on GATS 2000 Negotiations.”  Background paper to assist the National Committee on 
the WTO (services Sub Committee) in the preparation of Kenya’s position with respect to GATS 2000 
Negotiations.  
4 Valckx, N., “WTO Financial Services Commitments: Determinants and Impact on Financial Stability” 
Revised. June 2002 
5 See 3 above 
6 Miller, R. and Gallacher, S. (2002). The GATS framework and Trade in Professional (legal) Services.”  
Paper presented at the 24th International Trade Conference, Canberra, Australia, 9 October 2002.  
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GATS requires each member country to lower barriers against foreign service providers, 
in the service sub-sectors committed by the member, and to commit never to raise the 
barriers in the future, failure of which the member could be forced to compensate the 
affected countries.  
There are several provisions in GATS that make it favourable for developing countries: 
• Article IV on Increasing Participation of Developing Countries, which provides 
for the preferential treatment of developing countries. 
• Article XIX (paragraph 2), which provides for the principle of progressive 
liberalization by developing countries in line with their development situation. 
• Article V which allows countries in economic integration schemes to discriminate 
in favour of their partners so long as this is notifies to the WTO.7 
GATS provisions, however, are in the nature of “ best endeavour clauses” without any 
obligations on the part of Members to implement them.8
1.2.1.1 Negotiation Status 
The Uruguay Round (UR) managed to develop some of the rules to govern trade in 
services and also to liberalize a few service sectors, such as telecommunications and 
financial services. All developing and least developed countries limited their 
commitments to only 20% or less of the 160 or so service sectors, with the fewest 
commitments being in education and health and the most being in tourism.9  
GATS provided for successive rounds of negotiations, to liberalize services trade further, 
beginning not later than 5 years after its signing. As a result, a new round of negotiations 
(the so called GATS 2000 negotiations or Millennium Round) was to be launched during 
                                                 
7 Valckx, N., “WTO Financial Services Commitments: Determinants and Impact on Financial Stability” Revised. June 2002 
 
8 UNCTAD (2000). “ Multilateral Trading System Impact on National Economy and External Trade Policy 
Adaptation: Kenya.”  Report prepared by UNCTAD in the framework of the joint ITC/UNCTAD/WTO 
Integrated Technical Assistance Programme to Selected Least Developed Countries ((JITAP), Cluster 9, 
Geneva, March 2000 
9 Mutume, G. (2002). Trading Services: An opening or a noose? Africa puzzles over implications of trade 
in Geneva,” Africa Recovery Vol. 16, No. 1, April 2002 
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the 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference (Seattle) December 1999. In the run up to the 
conference, including at the 2nd Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, there was 
strong opposition by developing countries to the launch of a new round particularly 
because it sought to introduce new issues into the negotiations. The developing countries 
were increasingly frustrated because the benefits they had expected from the Uruguay 
round were not being realised. The opposition climaxed during the Seattle Conference, 
forcing it to collapse before the Millennium Round was launched.  
The Seattle Conference had sought to extend the reach of global or multilateral trade 
rules into areas that had never been covered by WTO before, such as investment and 
labour. Even though GATS was considered as the least controversial element of the 
Seattle agenda10, there are increasing concerns over the agreement’s impact on 
government’s provision and control of services in such areas as water, education and 
health.11 Concerns revolve around equity implications of liberalizing important social 
services and possibility of erosion of integrity with adverse effects on public health.  
1.2.1.2 The Millennium Round 
GATS 2000 negotiations or the Millennium Round started at the beginning of 2000 
despite the collapse of Seattle talks but were not launched until the 4th WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in Doha in November 2001. During the conference, considered then by 
developing countries as a success, a comprehensive work programme agreed upon, 
containing a great deal of areas of interest for developing countries, including other 
issues, implementation, special and differential treatment, agriculture, and the 
implications of TRIPS on public health. In fact, the Round became widely referred to as 
the Development Round.12    
                                                 
10 In comparison with, for instance, agriculture negotiations 
11 Mutume, G. (2002). Trading Services: An opening or a noose? Africa puzzles over implications of trade in Geneva,” Africa 
Recovery Vol. 16, No. 1, April 2002 
12 Ikiara M.M. (2003) “ The implications of GATS on Kenya’s Services Sector: Some Proposals on the Country’s Position on GATS 
2000 Negotiations.”  Background paper to assist the National Committee on the WTO (services Sub Committee) in the preparation of 
Kenya’s position with respect to GATS 2000 Negotiations. 
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1.2.1.3 Progress of GATS 2000 Negotiations  
There has been little if any progress in the Doha work programme. On implementation 
issues, solutions were supposed to be sent to the WTO General Council by the end of 
2002 but little progress has been made. On agriculture, there is also little progress with 
respect to the contentious issues of export subsidy and domestic support reduction. In the 
case of services, only few countries have made requests and offers and developed 
countries are not supporting the conclusion of work on GATS rules. 13 Only 30 countries 
have presented initial offers so far, most of them OECD countries. The offers made tend 
to address the interests, reflecting prior strategic consensus building. There is only 
minimal improvement in the market access and hardly any in the areas of interest for 
developing countries, principally made. 
Other elements of the Doha work programme in which little progress has been made are 
market access for non-agricultural products, WTO Rules with respect to anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures, improvement of the Dispute Settlement mechanism, trade 
and environment, and special and Differential (S&D) Treatment. Progress was made with 
respect to TRIPS and public health on the eve of the 5th Ministerial Conference 
(September 2003) in a concerted last minute effort to avoid imminent collapse of the 
Conference.  
The progress of services negotiations in the ongoing round is tied to the progress in other 
key elements of the Doha work programme. In particular, developing countries view 
progress in agriculture negotiations as a key determinant of progress in service 
negotiations. Another major prerequisite for progress in services negotiations is the 
assessment of services sectors to determine the impact of previous liberalization and the 
potential impact of further liberalization. Developing countries are keen not to make the 
mistakes they made during the Uruguay Round when they committed sectors like 
tourism, banking and insurance services before impact analyses.   
                                                 
13 See 10 above 
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Developed countries are pushing for commitments in such areas as public utilities, health, 
education, and environmental services (such as water for human consumption and waste 
management). Developing countries are concerned that some sectors of their populations 
may not be able to afford market prices for essential services, which are currently 
subsidised. They are also concerned that their service suppliers cannot compete with 
multinational firms that have massive financial strength, access to the latest technology 
and global infrastructure. Developed countries account for eighty percent (80%) of world 
service exports. Many countries in Africa lack the conditions required to build 
competitive service sectors; highly skilled human resources, technology, 
telecommunications infrastructure, competition regulations, government support for 
services, and national export service strategies.   
It is in recognition of its rising importance that a multilateral framework for liberalizing 
trade and investments in the service sector was conceptualized in the form of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) initiated under the aegis of the WTO. Among 
the gamut of services, financial services have undergone the most active international 
negotiations with the aim of dismantling cross-border trade restrictions. The financial 
services agreement (FSA) has been the latest among the WTO agreements on financial 
services to come in force (in March 1999). This followed previous attempts in 1993 and 
1995. The Financial Services Agreement includes commitments by 102 WTO members 
to reform their respective financial services market and provide increased market access 
through privatization and deregulation.14
Financial services trade liberalization negotiations (FSTLN), under the General 
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), aims at reducing or even totally removing all 
trade barriers in financial services sector by allowing foreign financial firms in insurance, 
banking, securities industry and other related financial services sectors to enter a host 
country and enjoy national treatment. The GATS, launched in the Uruguay Round in 
1986, was not able to reach any agreement until April 1994, several months after the 
                                                 
14 Valckx, N., “WTO Financial Services Liberalization: Measurement, Choice and Impact on Financial Stability,”Research 
Memorandum WO no 705 October 2002 
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conclusion of the Uruguay Round at the end of 199315 (Kono, et al …, 1997). 
Negotiations on financial services agreements were also extended far beyond the 
Uruguay Round and finally reached agreement in 1997. In the current and new Doha 
round of WTO negotiations, financial services and other services will be a “built-in” 
agenda, thus having the benefit of renewed emphasis 16(Key, 2003). 
Financial Services Trade Liberalization Negotiations specifies general commitments, 
specific exemptions, and modes of supply of services. These commitments governing 
modes of financial services supplied and they can differ from country to country and can 
be phased in over time depending on the initial agreements. However, the general 
commitments of GATS also apply to FSTLN have the following features.17 (Kono, et al 
…, 1997):  
•Most-favored nation (MFN): All liberalization measures must be extended to all WTO 
members equally. 
• Market access and national treatment: WTO member countries cannot discriminate 
between domestic and foreign firms, except when explicitly indicated at the time of 
joining the GATS. 
• Transparency: Local regulations should be published and made accessible to all. 
• Progressive liberalization: Member states agree to increase the number of liberalized 
sectors and to eliminate exceptions within sectors by committing to future negotiating 
rounds. 
• Dispute settlement mechanism: All commitments are legally binding. Harmed states can 
initiate an arbitration procedure. If found harmed, the country can impose sanctions 
against the violating country. 
                                                 
15 Kono, M., P. Low, M. Luanga, A. Mattoo, M. Oshikawa, L. Schuknecht, 1997, “Opening Market in Financial Services and the 
Role of the GATS,” WTO Special Report. 
 
16 Key, S. J., (2003), The Doha Round and Financial Services Negotiations, (Washington DC: The American Enterprise Institute 
Press). 
17 See 1 above 
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However, Financial Services Trade Liberalization Negotiations also has some important 
exemptions: 
• Exemption for government services: Activities of the central banks or other government 
authorities carrying out monetary and exchange rate policies are excluded from GATS. 
• Prudential carve-out: It is exempted from GATS and is designed to ensure that host 
country governments can protect their domestic financial system and participants of the 
financial system through the application of the host country prudential standards. These 
prudential measures in principle do not have to comply with the national treatment, 
market access commitments and its most favored nation responsibility.18 . 
However, the prudential carve-out is not meant to be an overriding exception to a 
member’s obligations, as prudential measures should not be used to avoid a member’s 
obligation or commitments. 
•Some non-prudential related government regulations (for example, practices related to 
industrial policy to provide credit to certain industries) are also exempted from the 
commitments of the GATS unless such policies violate the general commitments as 
specified above.19 (Kono, et al…, 1997). 
GATS establishes a framework of progressive liberalization in services trade, which 
allows countries substantial flexibility to determine: 1) which sectors of the service 
economy they wish to open up to foreign suppliers and competition and 2) what options, 
if any, they want to retain to restrict competition in these "open" sectors. GATS applies to 
all services in any sector except those supplied in the exercise of government authority, 
defined as supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more 
service suppliers. 
                                                 
18 Key, S. J., (2003), The Doha Round and Financial Services Negotiations, (Washington DC: The American Enterprise Institute 
Press). 
19 Kono, M., P. Low, M. Luanga, A. Mattoo, M. Oshikawa, L. Schuknecht, 1997,“Opening Market in Financial Services and the Role 
of the GATS,” WTO Special Report. 
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WTO Members' commitments to allow for market entry in specific sectors of their 
choosing appear in schedules. These schedules spell out any restrictions on the extent of 
market access afforded to foreign suppliers, e.g. whether their numbers are restricted, and 
the degree of national treatment accorded to foreign companies. Once scheduled, these 
commitments are bound; meaning they can be modified or withdrawn if a country finds 
this necessary, but they are required to negotiate compensation with trading partners for 
the losses incurred. GATS commitments in any particular sector are undertaken with 
regard to four modes of supply, as defined in GATS: Mode l—cross border supply; Mode 
2--consumption abroad; Mode 3-- commercial presence; and, Mode 4--temporary 
movement of natural persons. For any scheduled sector, countries may vary the level of 
commitments by mode to accommodate domestic policy objectives. 
These four mode provide market openings to financial services in the following ways 
 Such market opening relates to: 
1) Cross-border trade (mode 1) for a few insurance services and for services in 
support of banking and investment (e.g. advice), 20 
2) The right of consumers to purchase abroad (mode 2) financial services mentioned 
for mode 1 as well as all other banking or financial services, 
3) The right of establishment and expansion by all foreign service financial 
providers (mode 3), including through acquisitions, and the right of governments to 
impose some conditions,21 
4) The temporary presence of managers and specialists in financial services (mode 
4) 
One part of the GATS agreement deals particularly with liberalization of (financial) 
services, i.e. opening up markets to allow services and services providers to enter the 
country. A country can decide which (sub) sectors it liberalizes, or "makes commitments" 
in, by adding them to its GATS list ("schedule"). For instance, a country can fully or 
                                                 
20 Valckx, N., “WTO Financial Services Liberalization: Measurement, Choice and Impact on Financial Stability,”Research 
Memorandum WO no 705 October 2002 
 
21 See 20 above 
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partly liberalize its financial services under GATS. A country's GATS schedule specifies 
which (financial) sub-services are liberalized for which "modes", and can include 
exemptions to some GATS rules. Domestic financial liberalization may include a) interest 
rate liberalization through elimination of interest rate and price controls; b) removal of entry 
barriers through admission of new entrants both domestic and foreign based on transparent 
regulatory requirements; c) removal of barriers on the scopes of financial business; d) 
reduction of sector barriers to allow financial industry to compete each other’s traditional 
scope of business; and e) Less state involvement through privatization of state-owned 
financial intermediaries and reduction of direct lending (Capiro, Honohan, and Stiglitz, 
2001).22
 A country can decide not to make a commitment in financial services by not adding 
financial services to the schedule.  
The decision to open up, or not, certain services sectors is an important part of the GATS 
negotiations. A country receives "requests" from other WTO members, i.e. lists of 
services for which other countries demand market opening. A country then replies with 
an "offer", a list of services it is prepared to liberalize. Subsequently bilateral secret 
negotiations follow in which countries bargain between each other's offers and requests. 
At the end of the bilateral negotiations between the many WTO members, each country 
includes a schedule of services for which it grants new market openings in the GATS 
agreement and which is valid for all WTO members (Most Favoured Nation Principle).  
1.2.1.4 Kenya and GATS Financial Services Commitments 
Kenya is the country that will be representative of the African countries in this study. It is 
therefore crucial that her commitments in GATS under the liberalization of financial 
services are scrutinised.  
The following are the specific commitments made by early 1998.  
                                                 
22 Caprio, G. Jr., P. Honohan, and J. E. Stiglitz (2001), “Introduction,” in Financial Liberalization: How Far and How Fast? ed. by 
G. Caprio, P. Honohan, and J. E. Stiglitz, (London) Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-30. 
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Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public has no limitation for 
mode 1 on market access (MA) but unbound when it comes to National Treatment (NT). 
There are no limitations on mode 2 for both Market Access and National Treatment while 
for mode 3, only institutions approved as banks under the Banking Act are allowed to 
operate in Kenya while for the same mode, reads unbound on National Treatment. For 
both Market Access and National Treatment on mode 4, the Act specifies that it is 
unbound except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.23
When it comes to lending of all types, including consumer credit, mortgage credit, 
factoring and financing of commercial transaction for mode 1 and 2 there are no 
limitations for both Market Access and National Treatment while for mode 3 there is no 
limitation on Market Access while for National Treatment it is unbound. For both Market 
Access and National Treatment on mode 4, the Banking Act specifies that it is unbound 
except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.24  
When it comes to participation in issues of all kinds of securities and provision of 
services related to such issues except underwriting mode 1, the Act provides that 
securities issued in a foreign jurisdiction cannot be offered or traded in the Kenyan 
market. This is a provision that points to Market Access. The same is unbound for 
National Treatment. There are no limitations on mode 2 for both Market Access and 
National Treatment while for mode 3, foreign portfolio investors can hold up to 40% of 
the shareholding of a locally listed company. They can also take up to 40% of any 
additional public offering by a foreign convened listed company. Meanwhile, it is 
unbound when it comes to limitations on National Treatment. For both Market Access 
and National Treatment on mode 4, the Act provides that the aforementioned are 
unbound, except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.25    
Asset management except pension fund management has no limitation on mode 1 when it 
comes to Market Access while it is unbound for National Treatment. There are no 
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limitations for both Market Access and National Treatment for mode 2, while for mode 3, 
it is provided that 30% of paid up capital must be held by Kenyan nationals and it is 
unbound for National Treatment. Market Access and National Treatment for mode 4 is 
unbound except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.26  
Advisory and auxiliary services has no limitations on both Market Access and National 
Treatment on mode 1 and 2 while it has no limitation on mode 3 under the Market Access 
column and it is unbound for National Treatment. Both Market Access and National 
Treatment is unbound for mode 4, except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.27  
In the case of insurance services, Kenya has committed life and non-life insurance, 
brokering and agency services, auxiliary services including assessors, intermediaries and 
loss adjusters; and insurance and retrocession. However, there are limitations to market 
access, especially with respect to commercial presence, with foreign equity limited to 
40%. National treatment and movement are unbound.28  
In life insurance, mode 1 and 2 are unbound for both Market Access and National 
Treatment, while for Market Access in mode 3, one third of the paid up capital must be 
owned by Kenyan Nationals and there are no limitations on National Treatment under the 
same mode. Under mode 4 both Market access and National Treatment are unbound 
except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.29  
When it comes to mode 1 on non-life for limitations on market access it is unbound, 
except for aviation, marine and engineering and it provides that National Treatment will 
be unbound. There is no limitation on mode 3 when it comes to market access. However 
                                                 
26  WTO, Trade Policy Review Kenya, 2004 
 
27 See 26 above 
28 Economic Review, Various Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), International Centre for Economic 
Growth (ICEG) and K-Rep Holdings Ltd., “National Micro and Small Enterprises,” Baseline Survey 1999.  
29 See 28 above 
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it is unbound for National Treatment.  Mode 4 is unbound for both Market Access and 
National Treatment except as indicated in the horizontal commitments.30  
Market access in agency services in Kenya is unbound except for re-insurance services 
while there are no limitations on National Treatment. Mode 2 is unbound for both Market 
Access and National Treatment while for mode 3, agency services are restricted to 
Kenyan nationals and is unbound for National Treatment. Both Market Access and 
National Treatment in mode 4 is unbound except as indicated in the horizontal 
commitments.31  
For auxiliary services, assessors, intermediaries and loss adjusters under mode 1,2 and 3 
there are no limitations on both Market Access and National Treatment while it is 
unbound for mode 4 for both Market Access and National Treatment, except as indicated 
in the horizontal commitments. In re-insurance and retrocession sub sector on mode 1, 2 
and 3 under Market Access, mandatory cessions must be placed with Kenya Re 25%, Zep 
Re 10% and Africa Re 5% while there are no limitations on National Treatment for the 
three modes. Both Market Access and National Treatment on mode 4 are unbound except 
as indicated in the horizontal commitments.32
1.2.2 The Problem Statement 
One area of the Doha Development Agenda that has generated a lot of interest in the 
African Countries is the GATS. This is due to the different views held on the 
applicability of the agreement to the continent. Some hold the view that the agreement 
could only lead to the opening up of the financial services sector and finally efficient and 
customer responsive markets. Others are of the opinion that the GATS has come too soon 
for Africa; a continent that needs to first develop its domestic service industry before 
adopting a service liberalizing instrument like GATS.  
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Growth (ICEG) and K-Rep Holdings Ltd., “National Micro and Small Enterprises,” Baseline Survey 1999 
31 See 30 above 
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The aim of this paper is to examine both positive and negative effects of the GATS 
agreement on the financial services sector in African countries and to finally conclude 
whether the benefits of the agreement outweigh the losses or vice versa.  
1.2.3 The Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this study is to examine the expected effects of the GATS on the financial 
service industry in Africa. The expected effect of GATS on the financial sector in Africa 
is a key concern in the continent. This is due to the importance of the industry to the 
development of the continent and its peoples.  
Attention will be paid to the liberalizing effect that GATS will have and how this will 
impact on the financial sector in Africa. The study will aim at determining the effect of 
GATS on the financial sector in Africa.  
1.2.4 Research Questions 
1. How will the implementation of GATS impact the banking industry in Africa? 
2. How will the implementation of GATS impact the insurance industry in Africa? 
1.2.5 Importance of the Study 
The economic benefits of GATS on the financial services sector in Africa as espoused by 
the proponents of GATS have been set out very clearly in various articles and research 
papers; so are the expected losses as spelt out by the opponents of GATS. This paper will 
analyse both the merits and the demerits of GATS on the financial sector in Africa and 
will recommend the position that African nations should take in the Doha Development 
Agenda as regards GATS.  
The study is significant in clearly pointing out the way that Africa should take in the 
Doha Development Agenda as regards GATS and the financial sector. It is of paramount 
importance that African countries come up with a good framework for negotiating the 
GATS agreement to ensure that they get terms that will lead to sustainable development 
in their markets.  
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1.2.6 Scope of the Study 
The research will deal with the GATS and its expected impact on the financial services 
sector in Africa only. The study will be confined to the financial service sector in Africa. 
The financial services sector in Africa will be divided into two i.e. The Banking sector 
and the Insurance sector. The study will investigate both the expected positive effects and 
the expected negative effects of the GATS on the financial services sector in Africa. 
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2.0 CHAPTER 2
2.1 Literature Review 
An assessment of the expected impact of GATS on the service industry in Africa will 
give a direction as to the expected impact of GATS on the financial industry in the 
continent. A general overview of the expected impact of GATS on the service industry in 
Africa is necessary so as to give the general direction to African countries when engaging 
in future GATS commitment negotiations. This chapter will assess the impact of GATS 
on the service industry in developing countries. It will also focus on GATS and its 
expected impact on Human Rights in the continent of Africa. This is vital due to the 
increased focus of the impact of trade on human rights worldwide.  It will then narrow 
down to the financial services industry and examine the expected impact of GATS on the 
same in the African continent.   
2.1.1 GATS and the Service Industry in Africa 
2.1.2 BENEFITS OF GATS 
IMF Balance of Payments statistics indicated that, in 1998, industrial countries had a 73 
per cent share of world exports and imports in services, while Developing Countries had 
a twenty seven per cent share (27%)33. There are a number of reasons for this imbalance, 
including the greater emphasis in the developed world over the last two decades on 
market-oriented microeconomic reform in key service sectors, including privatization; the 
role of technology in facilitating internationally-competitive services exports; and the fact 
that the demand for services is naturally linked to the state of economic development in 
any country. Nevertheless, the imbalance is a significant issue, and one that will be 
addressed as a matter of course in the services negotiations. 
Services are, however, not only important in terms of trade. A central consideration is 
that, "The developing countries have limited flexibility to offer less liberalization of 
services than developed countries but they are not allowed a free ride. The GATS is 
                                                 
33 IMF Balance of Payments Year Book, 1999 
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based on the argument that if the national governments have concern for economic 
efficiency, the optimal policies would be the same both for developed as well as 
developing countries."34
Over the last few years, there has been extensive research into this argument. To use a 
summary by Mattoo35, “Many services are inputs into production and inefficient 
production of such services acts as a tax on production - - -Well functioning services 
industries contribute to growth in different ways. An efficient financial sector allows 
resources to be deployed where they have the highest returns- - -Improved telecom 
efficiency generates economy-wide benefits as telecommunications are a vital 
intermediate input and are crucial to the diffusion of knowledge.” 
Similarly, transport services contribute to the efficient distribution of goods within a 
country, and greatly influence a country's ability to participate in global trade. Business 
services such as accounting and legal services are important in reducing transaction costs; 
education and health services are necessary in building up the stock of human capital, a 
key ingredient in long run growth performance.36
An example which DFAT quoted in its 1999 publication on Global Trade Reform37 is 
that provided by a 1998 World Bank study about the rise in agricultural output in India 
following banking liberalization: 
Expansion of commercial bank networks and availability of financial services had a very 
substantial positive effect on private agricultural investment in India. Analysis of data 
from 85 districts in 13 Indian states revealed that expansion of commercial banks into 
rural areas increased both investment and productive output. Investment in tractors rose 
by 13 percent, in pump sets by 41 percent, in milk animals by 46 percent, and in draft 
animals by 38 percent. 
                                                 
34 Chadha, 2000 
35 Mattoo, Aaditya. 2000. "Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: Towards a Pro-Active Role" in The 
World Economy Vol 23, Number 4 
36 Mattoo, 2000 
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Demand for fertilizer rose by about 23 percent, and aggregate crop output rose by nearly 
3 percent.38
It is worth noting how the landscape of services sectors has changed even in the last five 
years. Technological advances, and greater competition in the sector arising from the 
privatization of former monopolies are contributing to this transformation. 
The ability to collect, process and transmit information in real time has increased the 
possibility of introducing competition in many network-based infrastructure services, 
such as telecommunications, energy and transportation. 
It has made it possible to separate the management of the physical infrastructures such as 
telephone lines, electric power grids, and pipelines from the services provided through 
those facilities. Different service providers can use the same infrastructure, yet compete 
with each other in supplying the services involved to consumers.39
Commentators have noted the increasing trends towards privatization of network based 
services sectors, and the implications for competition and tradability. In the telecoms 
sector, Low and Mattoo have observed that, "For the most part, traditional state-owned 
monopoly suppliers have not been successful in providing low-cost, efficient or even 
widely available services in many countries".40 A study by the Norwegian Michelsen 
Institute, circulated at the Council for Trade in Services this year, indicated that "a 
comparison of prices on communication services show that Tanzanians pay 50 per cent 
higher connections charges and 11 per cent higher local call rates relative to the USA 
despite having less that 1 per cent of its purchasing power"41
In the APEC Group on Services this year, economies have exchanged information on the 
impact of liberalization of services sectors, eg Thailand has indicated that it has 
unilaterally increased market access to its commercial banking sector and increased 
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presented at the International Symposium on 'Trade in Services: China and the World'. 
40 Low, Patrick and Mattoo, Aaditya. 1997. "Reform in Basic Telecommunications and the WTO Negotiations: the Asian Experience" 
41 Hodge, James and Nordas, Hildegun, "Liberalization of Trade in Producer Services: the Impact on Developing Countries". 
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foreign equity provisions.42 The Peruvian Ministry of Industry assessed the benefits of 
services liberalisation in financial and telecoms in particular as: 
• More competition 
• Introduction of new products 
• Foreign investment 
• Reduction in services prices.43 
In short, services liberalization can be beneficial to DCs in and of itself, since it reduces 
the costs of services inputs to other sectors of the economy, and thereby enhances 
allocative efficiency and international competitiveness. 
Australia supports comprehensive negotiations; that is, we consider no service sector 
should be excluded from the negotiations. Like every Member, Australia has its own 
sensitive sectors, ours being audiovisual, and public health and education. But we believe 
every sector should be on the table, to allow open debate about the least trade restrictive 
ways to defend our national interests. Sectors of interest to DCs, eg maritime, 
construction and tourism, will be paid due attention only through comprehensive 
negotiations. We recognize that, despite all the evidence that points to the advantages of 
reform and liberalization, the nature of multilateral negotiations is such that DCs will 
require trade-offs. In multilateral negotiations, DCs have the capacity to form powerful 
coalitions and to hold out for packages of benefits. 
Because of the substantial scope for productivity improvements in the services sector, 
liberalization would be expected to result in big gains. Modeling commissioned by the 
Australian Government in 1999 indicated a substantial annual gain in world welfare of 
US$250 billion if global distortions in the provisions of services were reduced by 50 per 
cent. All economies would stand to gain and, in proportion to the size of GDP, the gains 
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would be spread fairly evenly. In this area, the modeling significantly understates the 
dynamic effects of services reform.44  
The overall goal for services in the new WTO Round must be to maximize the benefits of 
efficient service sectors for all countries. Multilateral trade rounds allow the world 
economy to keep growing on a sustainable basis. The GATS negotiations are an 
important opportunity to underpin further expansion of services trade, generate 
intersectoral gains for the merchandise trade sector, and contribute to the economic and 
employment growth and technological innovation that improves people’s lives.   
Hereunder is a summary of the benefits of GATS to the service industry as put forth by 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative in its Trade in Services Policy Brief 
of March 2006:  
2.1.2.1 Financial Services: 
A recent World Bank report indicates that countries with open financial services sectors 
grow on average one percentage point faster than other countries. Improved commitments 
send a strong signal to foreign financial services companies that they should devote their 
resources and technologies to particular countries and that needed infrastructure will be in 
place to support their exporting objectives. Financial services suppliers provide essential 
finance, risk transfer and investment management tools to help economies grow and 
diversify and become competitive suppliers of goods and services. Foreign presence also 
contributes to the stability of financial markets by providing deeper pools of capital, risk 
management techniques and technologies not available on the domestic market.45
2.1.2.2 Telecommunications: 
A competitive telecommunications market brings many benefits to businesses and 
consumers including lower costs, efficient and innovative services, and expanded 
opportunities and choices. Network expansion has been a key driver of economic growth 
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for many countries, and private investment has been the main catalyst for such expansion; 
much of it in the developing world. According to the World Bank, the private sector 
invested $230 billion in telecommunications infrastructure in the developing world 
between 1993 and 2003, with the greatest investment in those countries that were open to 
competition. Indeed as more markets become competitive, expansion into other markets 
will become essential. Thus, all countries seeking to benefit from the gains of a 
competitive global telecommunications market have a stake in seeing market opening 
commitments in this sector.46
2.1.2.3 Express Delivery: 
Whether delivering commercial contracts, financial agreements, a replacement part for an 
electric power turbine, or even merchandise exports to support just-in-time 
manufacturing, express delivery services play a critical role in supporting the 
competitiveness of domestic industries. Express delivery services also serve as an 
important source of local employment and economic development, employing nearly 1 
million people in over 200 countries. The vast majority of those personnel are hired 
locally to provide the vital link to the domestic market. GATS commitments on express 
delivery services signal a stable, commercially friendly regulatory regime in which 
potential investors will be able to maintain close contact with their suppliers and 
customers all around the world.47
2.1.2.4 Computer and Related Services: 
Computer and related services are a key services sector, providing support for many other 
industries. Without a robust computer services sector, many industries fail to realize the 
efficiency and productivity gains that computer services provide. In addition, this sector 
is one in which many countries, including developing countries, have keen export 
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interests. Thus, full market access opportunities create benefits for many Members' 
industries.48
2.1.2.5 Environmental Services: 
Environmental services commitments help to support sustainable development goals by 
providing greater access for lower cost to key environmental services, including: sewage 
services; solid and hazardous waste management; protection of biodiversity and 
landscape; protection of ambient air and climate; and remediation of soil and water. 
Increased access to affordable and effective environmental technologies and services was 
called for by Leaders at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
2002. Environmental services markets are forecast to grow quickly in the coming decade. 
For example, the World Bank estimates that annual investments in water supply and 
sanitation would likely to need to double from the historical level of $15 billion per year 
to $30 billion per year to meet future demand. In addition, GATS commitments 
contribute to employment of local personnel and transfer of technology and know-how in 
this important services sector.49
2.1.2.6 Distribution Services: 
Virtually every exported commodity makes its way to the market through distributors. 
Wholesalers, retailers, commissioned agents and franchisers provide the domestic 
infrastructure for moving goods to consumers. But inadequate competition in distribution 
markets raises prices and reduces the volume of goods sold. Excess profits enjoyed by 
uncompetitive middlemen come at the expense of both consumers and producers. GATS 
market access commitments bolster appropriate policies in support of competition.50
 
 
                                                 
48 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Services Facts www.ustr.gov Trade in Services Policy Brief – March 2006 
 
49 See 48 above 
50 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Services Facts www.ustr.gov Trade in Services Policy Brief – March 2006 
 
 33
2.1.2.7 Energy Services: 
Energy services commitments increase energy security by introducing new technology to 
enhance, for example, production of declining oil fields. New technology can also 
promote the development of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. 
Energy services commitments also encourage investment in infrastructure development 
and promote regional integration. In Africa, for example, a proposed gas pipeline project 
will transport flared gas in Nigeria to Ghana to supply an electric power plant. Energy 
services commitments also foster competition thereby creating jobs, enhancing skills and 
providing training opportunities.51
2.1.2.8 Higher Education: 
Properly regulated, increased trade in private higher education services opens the door to 
great economic, social, cultural and political benefits. Trade in private education 
complements public university systems by offering greater choice at global standards of 
quality, thereby helping to level the playing field in the knowledge-driven economy.52
2.1.2.9 Audiovisual Services: 
Opening the audiovisual services market benefits the domestic industry by introducing 
new technologies, skills and business methods, which in turn lead to the development of a 
multitude of new services, and foster local creativity and innovation. A growing number 
of countries have come to recognize that opening the audiovisual sector to foreign 
participation has broad, positive spillover effects for the local economy, including for 
such sectors as tourism, education and local manufacturing.53
 
2.1.3 GATS: PRO-DEVELOPMENT OR ANTI-DEVELOPMENT? 
At a time when many developed country governments are trying to present the WTO’s 
Doha work programme as a ‘development round’, GATS is often cited as one of the most 
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development friendly agreements. The architecture of GATS, it is argued, allows 
developing countries more flexibility than many other WTO agreements – indeed, 
developing countries made clear during the original negotiation of GATS that they would 
only accept an agreement based on a ‘positive list’ approach, whereby each country can 
determine which sectors it is ready to commit to liberalization, and under which 
conditions. In addition, the needs of developing countries are specifically identified as 
priorities in Articles IV and XIX of GATS, and again in the negotiating modalities agreed 
for the current round of GATS negotiations in March 2001.54
Yet the reality of the GATS negotiation process undermines the development-friendly 
architecture of the GATS agreement.55 The ‘progressive liberalisation’ of trade in 
services, which GATS requires, is achieved through successive rounds of market access 
negotiations, in which WTO member countries engage in secret discussions with each 
other in order to open up new service sectors to competition from Foreign Service 
providers.56
While developing countries formally retain the right to choose which services they will 
offer up to GATS, they come under intense pressure in these negotiations to meet the 
demands of more powerful WTO members.57 The fact that the negotiations are held on a 
bilateral basis, and in secret, sets the weakest countries against the strongest on a wholly 
unequal footing. The negotiation process thus turns the ‘development-friendly’ 
architecture of GATS against developing countries, and exposes them to exactly the type 
of bilateral pressure the WTO was supposed to avoid.58
No one disputes that power politics play a major role in the WTO. Former WTO Director 
General Mike Moore himself acknowledged that, despite formal equality between WTO 
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members, “there is also no denying that some members are more equal than others when 
it comes to influence”59. As well as enjoying far greater negotiating capacity, in terms of 
both material and human resources, richer countries have in the past exerted extra 
pressure on poorer WTO members by raising the prospect of loss of aid or trade 
preferences if they do not drop their opposition to rich countries’ positions60. 
In the context of services negotiations, experience has shown that the overwhelming 
bargaining power of rich countries can pressure developing countries into surrendering 
key service sectors to GATS even when it is not in their interest to do so. UNCTAD’s 
recent survey of developing country trade delegates confirms that the process of services 
negotiations is itself hampering their ability either to benefit or protect themselves from 
GATS: Of particular concern to developing countries is the lack of transparency of the 
ongoing request/offer process within the GATS, which hinders their capacity to evaluate 
the requests submitted to them by developed country trading partners, and the 
formulation of their own requests and offers, which is a particularly complex task. 61
Partly as a result of this imbalance of power at the WTO, developing country 
representatives point out that there has been little progress towards realizing the pro-
development objectives of Articles IV and XIX. Article IV of GATS sets the goal of 
increasing the participation of developing countries in services trade, but WTO statistics 
reveal that their share in both exports and imports of services remains substantially the 
same today as it was when GATS came into force in 1995 62. The global services market 
itself has expanded significantly over the past eight years, and developing countries’ 
trade in services has grown accordingly in absolute terms, but there are concerns that 
these economic benefits have largely been limited to increased participation by certain 
Asian economies. 
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In addition, there are concerns that GATS commitments have not led to any rise in the 
overall level of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services to developing countries. This 
prospect of increased FDI flows is still cited as a primary reason why it should be in the 
interest of those countries to make GATS commitments rather than simply to undertake 
liberalization of service sectors and use other channels to signal their openness, 
independently of GATS. As revealed by UNCTAD’s assessment of developing countries’ 
experience of trade in services, this signaling through GATS commitments has not had 
the desired effect: 
There is no empirical evidence to link any significant increase in FDI flows to developing 
countries with the conclusion of GATS.63  
In frustration at the lack of progress in realizing development objectives in respect of 
services trade, a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries put forward a proposal 
to the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services that a new mechanism should be established 
to monitor achievements in advancing towards the goals set out in Article IV, with a 
stocktaking of progress that was to be held at the WTO’s Cancun Ministerial Conference 
in September 200364. 
In order to minimize the negative effects of GATS, Article XIX establishes that 
developing countries are to be granted greater flexibility in the GATS liberalization 
process in order to respect their level of development. As a means to identifying what 
flexibility is needed, Article XIX also stipulates that there should be an assessment of the 
impact of services liberalization prior to each new round of negotiations in order to 
inform the guidelines and procedures of that round. Yet this latter requirement was not 
honored in the development round, and assessment has instead become a standing item 
on the agenda of the Council for Trade in Services. 
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Developing country representatives and civil society organizations have united in calling 
for assessment as an essential precondition of making offers in the development round of 
services negotiations65. This call for an evidence-based approach to the negotiations 
stands in contrast to the accelerated negotiating timetable engineered at the WTO’s Doha 
Ministerial Conference – in the face of opposition from many developing countries – 
which sought to rush through the tabling of initial GATS offers by the end of March 
2003. 
In addition to this failure to realise the pro-development elements of GATS, there are also 
provisions within the agreement that have a negative impact on national efforts to 
maximise the developmental benefits of foreign investment.66 Many countries welcome 
foreign investment in individual service sectors, and employ a range of measures to 
ensure that this investment contributes to economic development and other policy 
objectives. Such measures include: requirements that foreign investors establish a joint 
venture with a domestic partner; equity ceilings on foreign capital participation; 
conditions of minimum capital investment; performance requirements in areas such as 
technology transfer, public service provision, employment or training of local staff.67
Yet these standard methods of managing foreign investment in services to the maximum 
benefit of the host country are threatened when a sector is bound under GATS. Article 
XVI of GATS prohibits WTO members from using requirements on type of legal entity 
(such as joint ventures) or limitations on foreign capital participation, unless such 
measures have already been specified in that country’s national schedule of GATS 
commitments. Article XVII prohibits WTO members from employing any measures, 
which favour domestic over Foreign Service providers – either explicitly (de jure) or in 
practice (de facto) – unless those measures have already been specified in the country’s 
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national schedule. This would include many of the performance requirements listed 
above68. 
Even when countries have specified these requirements in advance, their very presence in 
national GATS schedules sets them up as targets for removal in the services negotiations 
at the WTO. This is well demonstrated by the requests submitted by the EU to 109 other 
WTO members in the development round of negotiations, which were leaked and 
published online in February 200369. These documents requested the removal of joint 
venture requirements and limitations on foreign equity participation in countries such as 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, China, Cuba, the Philippines, Egypt and India – as well as 
a host of performance requirements on investors in these and other countries. All these 
countries must now expend precious negotiating capital in trying to protect their own pro-
development policies from elimination. 
The need to protect those policies in the present, however, is made more urgent by the 
fact that GATS makes it effectively impossible to reintroduce them again in the future, 
should it be considered prudent or necessary to do so. The ‘progressive liberalization’ 
programme of GATS allows only for the removal of access conditions and performance 
requirements on foreign investors, not the restoration of old ones or the introduction of 
new, while the disciplines on modification of national schedules (Article XXI) require 
countries to provide acceptable compensation to any WTO member whose benefits “may 
be affected” by the proposed modification before it can be introduced. In practice, these 
terms are so punitive that GATS commitments are – to quote David Hartridge, former 
Director of the WTO’s Trade in Services Division – “irreversible”.70
2.1.4 DOES GATS LEAD TO PRIVATISATION? 
Committing a service to GATS means assenting to competition in that sector in 
accordance with GATS disciplines, and binding it for the future. When a country binds 
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liberalization of a service sector in its national schedule of GATS commitments, there is 
no requirement that it should distinguish as to whether the service is currently provided as 
a public service throughout that country, whether it is exclusively the domain of the 
private sector, or whether – as is the case in many services – public and private provision 
coexist, either in different localities or side by side. 
It is the sector itself that is committed to liberalization under GATS. 
This approach has fuelled concern that public services, which have a direct significance 
for children, especially poor children, might fall under GATS disciplines when a 
particular sector is bound under GATS. While Article I:3 excludes “services supplied in 
the exercise of governmental authority” from the provisions of GATS, its definition of 
those services is a narrow one, requiring that they be supplied “neither on a commercial 
basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers”. It has been widely accepted 
that such a definition has very limited application in today’s world, where almost all 
public services are supplied either in competition with other suppliers or on a commercial 
basis, or both71. Indeed, the act of liberalising a service sector introduces competition by 
definition. 
There is already broad consensus that some public services do fall under GATS 
disciplines. Peter Carl, Director General for Trade at the European Commission, provided 
confirmation of this in his statement to the European Parliament’s public hearing on 
GATS in November 2002 when he noted that: “Many public services are not subject to 
the GATS” – a significant shift from previous claims that all public services were 
excluded72. Similarly, UK Government trade negotiators have acknowledged that many 
public services provided in the UK with the increased participation of the private sector 
would already fall under GATS. 
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Liberalization of a service under GATS thus represents a binding commitment to permit 
competition in that sector, irrespective of how the service might have been provided in 
the past. 
This competition allows for the continued presence of public services, but in cases where 
the service has previously been provided by the public sector alone, the process of 
liberalization will lead to a transfer of at least part of the service into the private sector. 
As noted by International Financial Services London, one of the most active lobbying 
groups promoting services liberalization: 
[O]pening service markets to foreign providers is self-evidently inconsistent with 
retaining public monopolies.73  
Irrespective of whether they have held a monopoly in the past, public services face new 
challenges once the sectors in which they operate have been opened up to competition 
through GATS – in particular, the challenge from some of the world’s largest 
multinational companies. 
Even for countries in which the public sector has long faced competition from domestic 
providers, the strength of this foreign challenge can be a direct threat to the very 
existence of public services. 
As noted by a group of developing countries in a key submission to the WTO Council for 
Trade in Services: 
For developing countries, privatization by foreign companies is very much a ‘natural’ 
consequence of service sector liberalization, since the government and local suppliers 
will not be able to withstand the competition.74  
This tendency for multinational service companies to undermine the public sector has 
been documented across several service sectors of importance for the disadvantaged in 
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Africa. In the case of health insurance, for example, which has grown into a multi-billion 
dollar worldwide industry, competition from multinationals threatens the viability of state 
social insurance programmes designed to spread costs across society and provide 
affordable health care for all. Fragmentation of the sector as a result of greater 
competition “segments and destabilizes the market and undermines the ability to build 
larger, more equitable risk pools that spread costs between rich and poor, healthy and 
sick” 75
Yet the best example of the close connection between liberalization and privatization of 
services can be found in relation to water. The special status of water services as a natural 
monopoly means that liberalization to secure private sector involvement entails 
privatization of the service in the locality in which liberalization has taken place, as there 
is no possibility of competition in the physical delivery of the service through the one 
network.76 While the public sector may continue to provide water in other localities, 
therefore, opening up the service to the private sector automatically entails privatization 
in the locality concerned.77 Crucially, too, the attempt to increase the involvement of the 
private sector in the provision of basic services such as health, water and education in 
developing countries has become a high priority of donor and lending agencies at the start 
of the 21st century. The World Bank’s Private Sector Development Strategy, approved in 
2002, identifies increased private sector involvement as a priority across its lending 
bodies, and sets out the mechanism whereby future lending will be tied to a country’s 
attractiveness to private investors. Individual arms of the World Bank Group have 
developed their own plans for increasing private sector involvement in social services: 
also in 2002, the Bank’s International Finance Corporation published its strategy for 
extending private sector involvement in social sectors which have traditionally been free 
of private investment. The IMF has also made much of its lending conditional upon 
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privatization: a random review of IMF loan agreements signed with 40 countries during 
2000 revealed that water privatization or full cost recovery was a condition in 12 of 
them.78
GATS provides both a formal framework for registering the liberalization of services and 
a process for securing the liberalization of more sectors. More importantly still, 
committing a sector to GATS binds a country or locality to that liberalization in the 
future. Thus any liberalization undertaken as a result of pressure from donor or lending 
agencies becomes effectively irreversible, even if the decision to involve the private 
sector turns out to have been a mistake. This has particular relevance in the case of water 
services, where the involvement of the private sector has in many instances not delivered 
the benefits hoped for. Once a service has been committed to liberalization under GATS, 
it is contrary to the market access disciplines of GATS Article XVI to return the sector to 
public monopoly provision, as this would represent a quantitative restriction of the 
market and thus a reversal of the liberalization commitment. 
2.1.5 GATS and Human Rights 
The proponents of liberalization of services have endeavoured to put forth the benefits of 
GATS to the developed countries and their developing counterparts. However there have 
been concerns of GATS and its expected impact on Human Rights by opponents to 
liberalization of services, especially in developing countries. There is serious concern that 
GATS undermines a number of rights. One such example is the right to health. Health 
services are included under GATS in several sectors and across all four modes, and many 
countries have already committed some of their health services to liberalization in their 
national GATS schedules. Moreover, the ‘progressive liberalization’ envisaged by GATS 
drives WTO member countries to make more such liberalization commitments in future 
rounds of GATS negotiations. 
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The right to the highest attainable standard of health is enshrined in Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Its 
application is further developed in General Comment No 14 of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states that the right to health demands that 
functioning, good quality health care facilities be available and accessible to all without 
discrimination. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR, or 
Committee) is the UN expert body that monitors the implementation of International 
Covenant on ESC rights. Most particularly, General Comment 14 affirms that States 
parties to the ICESCR have a non-derogable, core obligation “to ensure equitable 
distribution of all health facilities, goods and services.”79
Under mode 3 of GATS, liberalization in the health sector involves allowing construction 
of foreign hospitals or dental clinics catering to rich urban patients, or opening national 
health insurance systems to multinational insurance companies. Opening up health 
services to Foreign Service providers in this way can lead to a range of problems. These 
are: 
• Fragmentation of a country’s national health system. Private sector facilities run by 
foreign providers typically draw the most skilled and experienced staff away from the 
public sector by means of higher pay and other inducements, leaving poor and remote 
areas without the personnel needed to run essential health care facilities. GATS 
liberalization thus works in opposition to progressive programmes undertaken by 
countries such as Thailand, which has addressed its human rights obligations by 
developing a sophisticated system of incentives to attract medical personnel to work in 
poorer rural areas.80
• Private health insurance schemes tend to focus on the richest and healthiest customers 
only, destroying the possibility of cross-subsidization on which national insurance 
systems depend. 
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As noted by WHO research, liberalization of insurance systems “segments and 
destabilizes the market and undermines the ability to build larger, more equitable risk 
pools that spread costs between rich and poor, healthy and sick.”81 For countries such as 
Indonesia, Vietnam or the Philippines that are attempting to build sustainable health 
systems on the basis of social insurance schemes, such liberalization poses a real threat. 
Ultimately, by promoting the liberalization of trade in health services, GATS works 
against the equitable distribution of health facilities and threatens to undermine the right 
to health of those communities, which lose out. 
Another human rights concern is water. The right to water is indispensable for the 
realization of the right to health and the right to food, but as shown above, privatisation in 
this sector does not always protect these rights. The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has unequivocally stated that the right to water falls within the category 
of guarantees essential for enjoying the rights protected by the ICESCR. Specifically, the 
Committee points out in a General Comment that ‘water should be treated as a social and 
cultural good, and not primarily as an economic good. Water, and water facilities and 
services, must be affordable for all. The direct costs and charges associated with securing 
water must be affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups.’ And 
‘unaffordable increases in the price of water’ amount to a violation of human rights. 
Importantly, the Committee reminds governments that “agreements concerning trade 
liberalization should not curtail or inhibit a country’s capacity to ensure the full 
realization of the right to water”. The Committee has applied similar reasoning in its 
General Comments on the Right to Food and on the Right to Health. 
In addition, several aspects of the way new liberalization commitments are agreed to or 
implemented are inconsistent with human rights obligations. 
• Firstly, there is inadequate public participation in privatization processes and inadequate 
public information and participation in negotiations about trade liberalization. Although 
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some countries, such as India, are now seeking broader input on services negotiations, the 
processes still lacks transparency.82
This lack of transparency gives little opportunity for civil society, including human rights 
groups and individuals to alert governments to possible dangers of the violation of human 
rights. Public participation in policy-making, including economic policy, is a human 
right. For this reason, human rights advocates should speak out if their governments 
refuse to share information with them about the requests they have received or the offers 
they are making in the GATS negotiations. 
• Second, most governments engage in privatization and liberalization without a sense of 
whether these policies will be of benefit or harm the country at large, or whether they will 
benefit some sectors of society and leave others worse off. 
Human rights law requires governments to have a policy in place towards realization of 
human rights. Whilst the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
acknowledges that not all human rights recognizes that countries will not be able to 
ensure the realization of the right to food, health, water or housing immediately, it does 
impose a number of obligations on States which are of immediate effect: 
1. States must ensure that there is no discrimination with regard to enjoyment of human 
rights. However, liberalization of trade in essential services has frequently favored the 
wealthier inhabitants of a country, leaving those who were already poor or excluded 
worse off. Human rights advocates should consistently remind their economic 
policymakers of the obligation to ensure that new trade liberalization commitments do 
not result, in law or in practice, in discrimination in access to basic services. 
2. Human rights law requires that a State have a strategy in place to ensure the protection 
and realization of human rights. It follows from this that any new commitment affecting 
human rights – in the area of access to health care, education or water, say – must, 
according to human rights law, be assessed for its conformity to the strategy and its 
likelihood to further the realization of human rights. In particular, any new or planned 
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commitment must at a minimum not cause any regression from the existing level of 
enjoyment of relevant human rights. 
In spite of the provisions in GATS that an assessment of trade in services should be 
undertaken for guiding each round of negotiations, and that developing countries should 
have flexibility in liberalizing fewer sectors, no real assessment of the impact of trade in 
services on access to basic services or on human rights has been undertaken; nor have 
developing countries been given greater flexibility in the GATS negotiations. This means 
that the predominantly poor population in the developing countries, especially in Africa 
is in danger of having their human rights violated by virtue of the commitments made by 
their governments under GATS.  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended “States undertake 
assessments of the potential impact of global trade policies concerning the liberalization 
of trade in services on the enjoyment of human rights, including children’s rights.” In 
particular, the Committee recommended that these assessments should be undertaken 
prior to making commitments to liberalize services within the context of WTO or 
regional trade agreements. Further, if commitments to liberalize trade in services are 
made, the effects of those commitments on the enjoyment of the rights of the child should 
be monitored and the results of the monitoring should be included in State reports to the 
Committee. 
The current services negotiations at the WTO have also led to fears that countries could 
be pressurized into commitments that will limit the ability of governments to regulate and 
ensure affordable and equitable access to essential services: it is unrealistic to expect 
profit-seeking private companies operating under market forces to meet the needs of the 
less financially endowed sections of the population. This is partly because it is hard – 
particularly for governments that are not strong – to regulate a powerful private sector 
and partly because making commitments to allow foreign service providers access to the 
domestic market can reduce the scope a government has to regulate in the public interest 
(known in trade-related jargon as policy space). 
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Moreover, the bilateral format gives more scope than multilateral fora for arm-twisting 
by, powerful countries, to persuade smaller countries to open more service sectors to 
international competition. A 2002 study by the Commonwealth Secretariat83 found that 
newly acceded WTO Members, all of which are developing countries, were pressurized 
to open more service sectors during accession negotiations. 
2.1.6 GATS and the Financial Industry in Africa 
As noted84 provisions regarding the trade in financial services as provided for in GATS 
are a source of anxiety for the non-industrialized countries generally.85 This concern is 
because the consequences of the GATS is not well understood and there is a sense among 
these countries that they are being pressurized to sign something that may end up 
harming them. Most developing countries and Least Developing Countries in Africa- 
have so far not submitted initial GATS requests to trading partners. 
The reluctance to enter into the GATS is based on the reasons that follow. Firstly, most 
African economies have very rudimentary and fragile financial sectors.86 It is therefore a 
matter of concern how these financial sectors will cope with the increased competition 
brought about by GATS. Secondly, African countries also differ because of their 
relatively diverse colonial histories, and the interests of Multinational Corporations have 
typically led to a significant, but sometimes restricted, foreign presence in these 
countries. Thirdly, most African economies are at the same stage of economic 
development and tend to produce similar goods and services. In order to diversify their 
economic base, these countries face the dilemma of linking their investment strategy to 
their trade regime; for example, investing in the key sectors like manufacturing and 
services or the current main sectors like agriculture and mining, or trying to export 
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abroad versus investing in “newly engineered” home industries. Finally, these countries 
have a particularly strong desire to see their financial industry survive and prosper. 
However, one of the difficulties faced by African governments in choosing to diversify is 
to identify sectors that will yield sustainable economic growth. For this reason the 
financial sector, due to its appeal as a high skilled, high-income industry, is sometimes 
identified by these countries as a potential source of future economic activity. Hence, the 
effects of freer trade in financial services under the GATS have special significance for 
African economies. 
However the benefits of liberalization of the financial sector have been enumerated in 
other studies.87 Matoo (2001) postulates that a liberalized market will lead to more 
competition.88 Francois and Schuknecht (1999) find a strong positive relationship 
between growth and financial sector competition. Openness and liberalization is indicated 
by a country’s commitment to the GATS provisions.  
African countries cite their infant financial service industry and fear that its liberalization 
will lead to its demise. African country governments are worried that complying with 
GATS provisions on financial services will lead to consolidation in terms of alliances and 
mergers of the Multinational financial institutions. These mergers will in turn spell the 
end of domestic financial services providers. 
The liberalization negotiations on financial services in GATS fit neatly with the 
consolidation strategy of the world top financial industry and will reinforce it. The GATS 
negotiations do not only provide the financial industry with access to more markets and 
improved chances of full ownership of banks worldwide through mergers and 
acquisitions. The GATS agreement also guarantees that this liberalization is difficult to 
reverse (Art. XXI) and those national measures that hamper profit making and 
consolidation are being restricted (e.g. Art. VI, XVI and XVII). The 'Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services' clearly underpins the interest of financial 
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conglomerates that are engaged in cross-border and cross-sector consolidation. The EU 
requests many developing countries to open up according to this 'Understanding'. 
Concentration of financial services leaves governments – which need private finance – 
and customers with too little choice. It opens the way to abuse of economic and market 
power such as tacit price-fixing and high prices that are detrimental to development. 
Secret price-fixing occurs but seldom comes to light as happened in Germany by the 
insurance companies and in Kenya where a cartel of foreign banks fixed high interest 
rates.89
The GATS agreement has only very weak instruments to tackle problems related to 
concentration and consolidation. GATS Art. IX recognizes that business practices may 
restrict competition and trade in services but does not contain real competition policy 
measures. Only when restrictive business practices occur at the national level by Foreign 
Service providers can the domestic authorities ask for consultations. The home country 
should only give "sympathetic consideration" to such requests and non-confidential 
information.  Moreover, the negotiations on emergency safeguard measures to protect the 
local (financial) services industry from being overwhelmed by foreign services is being 
opposed and constantly postponed by Western countries. 
2.1.6.1 Positive impacts of GATS on the Financial Services Industry in Africa: 
2.1.6.1.1 Improving efficiency, functioning and management In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
experience of increased foreign participation in the domestic banking sector to date has 
shown such benefits as improved quality, pricing and supply of financial services and in 
risk management, accounting and transparency as well as increased competition.90 
Especially in poorer developing countries where the banking system is considered 
inefficient and unreliable, the entry of foreign banks is claimed to make domestic banks 
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more efficient and avoid the high economic cost of inefficiency that prevent 
development, trade and investment.91  
Research findings differ whether domestic banking efficiency increases by a large 
number of new foreign entrants or by (a few) new entrants with large market shares.92
 2.1.6.1.2 Increased access to foreign capital 
In Africa foreign financial firms have and will increase foreign capital inflows and the 
investment environment has improved. 
2.1.6.2 Negative Impacts of GATS on the Financial Services Industry In Africa:  
2.1.6.2.1 A Pick and Choose Approach by Foreign Banks-Market Segmentation 
In Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, foreign firms use their financial power and 
international status to focus on the most lucrative transactions and lure rich and middle 
class customers. This means that the under privileged population will not have access to 
the financial products that the foreign firms have on offer. This negative effect is further 
exacerbated by the dominance of the foreign firms in the African financial market.   
An important question is whether this cherry picking by foreign financial firms mobilizes 
more domestic savings or rather increases capital flight.  
2.1.6.2.2 Undermining lending to non-wealthy borrowers 
In case local banks do not survive the competition from large foreign banks, their 
expertise and capacity to lend to small producers and poorer households will be lost. This 
can enhance the divide between small and rich producers, make poverty eradication more 
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difficult, and have an impact on the whole economy. The foreign firms will, on the other 
hand concentrate on lending to the rich clients. 
2.1.6.2.3 Undermining poverty eradication 
This cherry picking and market segmentation is undermining poverty eradication as 
foreign financial firms are hardly interested to expand their 93 services to the poor. As 
was researched in Kenya, the situation is similar for foreign health insurance companies. 
These firms tailor their services to the94 wealthy city-dwellers who are already able to 
pay their hospital bills. They charge high premiums, unaffordable to poor patients. They 
refuse to accept patients who suffer from illnesses such as HIV/AIDS. This is in sharp 
contrast to the government’s public health insurance system, which is obligated to accept 
all patients.  
2.1.6.2.4 GATS 'flexibilities' not used 
During the previous GATS negotiations, Kenya agreed to liberalize its financial services 
without fully realizing that it was also subjecting the health insurance sector to the GATS 
rules. Article XVI prohibits governments from taking six specific kinds of measures to 
place limitations on companies, such as economic needs tests and restrictions on the 
number of service suppliers. During the negotiations, the Kenyan government could have 
reserved the right to impose a universal service requirement for foreign insurers only, but 
did not do so. The government can now require foreign companies to insure poor and 
vulnerable (HIV-positive or terminal) patients only if it also sets the same requirement 
for Kenya-based insurers, according to the GATS principle of non-discrimination and 
national treatment (Article XVII). Whether countries will impose universal service 
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obligation is another matter, as it is considered to have an unfavourable impact on the 
financial firms’ profitability and stability, and thus discourage investments.95
2.1.6.2.5 Widening the gender gap 
If cherry picking is common practice by foreign financial firms, it has also gender 
implications in developing countries. Women constitute the majority of the poor and are 
often very small producers or entrepreneurs. Although the female rate of repayment of 
loans is high, their lack of collateral means that they often have to rely on micro-credit 
systems for financing. If financial services liberalization does not provide them with 
better access to finance while larger entrepreneurs are better financed, their fight against 
poverty might be undermined and the gender gap increased. The experience of 80 
countries between 1988 and 1995 shows that foreign banks in developing countries tend 
to have greater profits, higher net interest margins and higher tax payments than domestic 
banks.96
2.1.6.2.6 Transferring wealth from poor to rich countries: Foreign financial firms that 
make profits from richer clients in developing countries and transfer that profit abroad, 
are thus transferring some of the wealth from developing countries to the rich home 
countries. Moreover, Art. XI of GATS does not allow restrictions on profit repatriation. 
2.1.6.2.7 Swift expansion of foreign financial services 
During the second half of the 1990s97, there has been a dramatic and very rapid increase 
in foreign ownership of banks and foreign banking activities in many developing 
countries. In Tanzania, liberalization for foreign banks increased their presence from 5% 
before 1980 (when policies where restrictive) to 76% in 2002.  
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96 H. Huizinga, S. Claessen & A Demirgüç-Kunt, How does foreign entry affect the domestic banking market?, World Bank Working 
paper nr. 1918, June 1998: based on the experience of 80 countries between 1988 and 1995; G. Bies, Financial liberalisation in Latin 
America, in Developing countries and GATS, Ed. C. Jepma & E. Kamphuis, University of Groningen, 2003, p. 64: based on research 
in Latin America. 
97 See: Yung Chul Park, Kee Hong Bea, Financial liberalisation and integration in East Asia, in Financial stability and growth in 
emerging economies - The role of the financial sector, Ed J.J. Teunissen & M. Teunissen , The Hague, 2003, p. 166-167, 178-179 
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It is difficult to establish whether the GATS agreement on financial services (1997) had 
an influence on this large increase of presence of Western banks. There was a general 
trend towards opening up financial sectors during that period -which was reflected in 
some GATS schedules98- alongside the strategy of many internationally operating 
financial firms towards global consolidation.   
The European Union requests during the current GATS negotiations to eliminate 
restrictions on full foreign ownership in small or poor developing countries can easily 
lead to domination by foreign banks. What are the consequences for monetary and 
development policy when foreign financial service providers control more than 75% of 
the banks, as is the case of Tanzania? 
Moreover, dominance by foreign banks makes these countries vulnerable to strategies of 
financial conglomerates that leave the country when profits decline. This makes it more 
difficult for the authorities to monitor the financial system. 
2.1.6.2.8 Difficulties in Africa to keep up with the rapid changes 
Rapid increase of foreign financial firms makes it difficult for domestic financial firms to 
meet the fierce competition, while the supervisory and regulatory authorities have trouble 
keeping abreast of the developments and their risks. The supervisory authorities find it a 
challenge monitoring new products brought into the market by foreign firms due to lack 
of existing rules covering these products. They (supervisory bodies) also find it a 
challenge coming up with the rules and regulations to regulate the same.  
2.1.6.2.9 Allocating more savings of developing countries to the rich countries 
Foreign financial conglomerates have more expertise on how to allocate domestic savings 
and capital in Western investments than the domestic financial firms in African countries 
countries. It might be too costly for foreign financial service providers to fully explore 
new investment opportunities in the host country. When developing countries have 
liberalized their financial services and capital account, more of their savings get allocated 
                                                 
98 A. Cornford, The  multilateral  negotiations  on  financial  services : current issues  and  future  directions, 2003, p. 5, 11-12 
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to the North (e.g. Northern company shares) and not in domestic investments. In this 
way, domestic economic development opportunities are lost and the global imbalance of 
capital allocation reinforced. As more and more developing countries' banks are being 
privatised, governments have fewer opportunities to prioritise the financing of domestic 
(service) industries. 
2.1.6.2.10 Little capacity to export financial services 
In Africa, the insurance sector has so far remained underdeveloped and without the 
necessary backing from governments. Lack of capacity and expertise has prevented the 
sector from starting viable commercial relations among African countries and making 
them fully prepared for international competition at home and on international markets.99
2.1.6.2.11 How much progress in efficiency? 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the presence of foreign banks increases loans by both domestic 
and foreign banks, but the variability of the loan supply decreases. Foreign banks in Sub-
Saharan Africa do not necessarily have fewer bad performing loans nor are they better 
capitalized than local banks – although better capitalization is often claimed as an 
advantage they enjoy, making them more resistant to financial crises. Foreign banks can 
out-compete locally owned banks in smaller economies because they can recover their 
high set-up costs from profitable operations elsewhere.100
 2.1.6.2.12 Risks of financial instability 
The risks of financial instability in developing countries resulting from financial services 
liberalization and GATS rules are being analysed below as follows: 
1. Too little awareness that new financial services require new prudential measures 
                                                 
99 Africa`s insurance industry needs assistance, in Addis Tribune, 7 June 2002. 
100 V. Murinde & M. Tefula, A foreign affair? How far does Africa need foreign banks? in Finance matters - Finance liberalisation: 
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2. Foreign financial services increase cross-border capital flows and financial instability 
3. GATS articles advance cross-border capital flows and capital account liberalization 
4. GATS articles challenge measures to deal with destabilising capital flows 
5. GATS articles undermine prudential measures and regulations domestic authorities 
take 
6. GATS articles affect the management of the financial industry and instability risks 
2.1.7 The risks of financial instability in developing countries   
While the GATS negotiations in financial services are about liberalization of financial 
services, they affect the national (de)regulation of financial markets and financial 
services, as well as measures that manage large capital transactions ("capital account"101). 
The latter two sets of measures are nonetheless the domain of finance authorities and 
affect the financial stability and economic situation of a country, especially in developing 
countries. Foreign banks contribute to a financial crisis by using capital account 
liberalisation for imprudent short-term lending policies and “herding behaviour”, and by 
hoping –mostly successfully- that governments will support repayment of commercial 
debt.  
Developing countries have already expressed their concerns that market opening and 
GATS rules might result in capital movements that create financial instability and affect 
governments' decisions to institute prudential measures to avoid a financial crisis. The 
devastating effects of a financial crisis, which are discussed in the next chapter, while 
focusing on the East Asian financial crisis, should prioritise negotiators' attention to 
assess the risks and address the concerns. However, these concerns are not much publicly 
discussed and hardly acknowledged by developed countries. As the World Bank puts it: 
Access to financial services is what matters for development, not who provides it.102
                                                 
101 The capital account covers capital movements for investments while the current account covers (the payment of) imports and 
exports of goods and services 
102 World Bank, Finance for growth: Policy choices in a volatile world, Policy research report, May 2001: summary of the report, p. 4 
at www.worldbank,org/research/interest/policyresrpt.htm 
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2.1.6.2.14 Too little recognition of the need for new prudential measures 
During the current GATS negotiations, many developing countries are not well informed 
what policy responses and prudential measures to take that avoid the risks of greater 
liberalization of financial services. 
However, many developing countries have no capacity to participate in the Committee or 
to engage all relevant financial authorities back home. There is no widely accepted 
framework to make econometric estimates of financial services liberalization, and 
statistical data are inadequate to predict future impacts.103  
Sudden intensification of competition by foreign new comers may encourage previously 
protected domestic financial institutions to take shortsighted risky responses104, such as 
reckless lending. Also foreign financial firms might engage in risky strategies to gain new 
shares of the market.  
In order to compete and attract more clients, financial conglomerates constantly introduce 
new products and more complex hybrid financial products. After GATS negotiations, 
foreign financial firms are likely to sell new and complex financial services in developing 
countries. If countries liberalise under GATS according to he Understanding on 
Commitments in Financial Services, the host countries have to give permission to "any 
new financial service" that foreign financial service providers introduce.105
New services might include banking through internet and e-mail, 'e-banking', which 
poses problems of supervision on money laundering and fraudulent activities, consumer 
protection and avoidance of systemic failure.106
Other new services might be derivative products and mutual fund management, 
instruments that involve a significant speculative component.  
                                                 
103 A. Cornford, The  multilateral  negotiations  on  financial  services : current issues  and  future  directions, 2003, p. 20 
104 Eichengreen, Toward a new international financial architecture: A practical post-Asia agenda, Washington (Institute for 
International Economics), 1999, p. 48. 
 
105 Art. 7 and Art. 11.D.3. of the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. Ironically, in the US, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission often scrutinises financial products before they are introduced 
106 The potential problems were discussed in different meetings of the Committee on Trade in Financial Services held in 2003. 
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Regulators and supervisors in developing countries will be challenged to take the 
necessary measures and avoid the problems that occurred in Western countries, which are 
supposed to have the best regulatory and supervisory regimes. As explained above, 
Western countries had to revise regulations after problems of too much speculative 
investment by pension funds and insurance companies. They also had to impose fines for 
scandals of misusing knowledge, the creation of a stock market bubble and charging too 
high fees. 
In the future, Basel II rules might transform financial services markets in developing 
countries. For instance, Basel II rules might make it more difficult for domestic banks to 
compete against international banks that enter their market under GATS commitments. 
Authorities will have to adapt to the situation and take necessary measures. 
 2.1.6.2.15 Foreign financial services increase cross-border capital flows and 
instability 
One way by which foreign banks tend to import financial instability is by lending in 
foreign currencies. The payment and repayment of loans in foreign exchange increase the 
rate of inflow and outflow of international capital. When this results in an imbalanced 
exchange between local and foreign currencies, it puts the exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserves under pressure, particularly if those loans are short-term.  
Too much demand for foreign exchange increases the balance of payments deficit and 
with it the risk of exchange rate and financial instability.  
Other products that foreign financial firms introduce with financial market opening are 
for instance "capital market products" such as investment instruments (e.g. mutual 
funds, advise for management of shares portfolio). These instruments often offer 
domestic residents to diversify their investments in shares and bonds issued by companies 
abroad in addition to domestic ones.107 Such services result in more cross-border capital 
                                                 
107 Yung Chul Park, Kee Hong Bea, Financial liberalisation and integration in East Asia, in Financial stability and growth in 
emerging economies - The role of the financial sector, Ed J.J. Teunissen & M. Teunissen , The Hague, 2003, p. 153 
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movements and can move in and out swiftly, especially when no capital movement 
restrictions are in place.  
New risk mitigation services and derivatives can also involve allocating money abroad. 
While such services diversify risks, they are also speculative and it is difficult to estimate 
by how much capital movements will increase and change direction.  
When cross border capital flows reach significant volumes and a high velocity, or lead to 
a balance of payments deficit, they can increase financial instability in the host country. 
Speculative financial products can also import financial crises from abroad.  
In addition, cross-border e-banking and buying foreign products -or even securities- 
through internet ("mode 1" under GATS), typically involve cross-border capital 
movements and foreign currencies. The lack of transparency in e-banking makes 
countries uninformed how it will facilitate large destabilising cross-border capital 
movements, especially in small countries.108
What is difficult to predict109 is how branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial firms 
and their headquarters will behave in times of financial crises in developing countries. 
Would they panic and move out all at once at the first sign of crisis as they did in East 
Asia in 1997? Or will they be able to resist the crisis with capital flowing in from the 
headquarters? In the current Argentinean crisis, foreign banks refuse to recapitalize their 
branches and subsidiaries.110 Most East Asian countries have not been able to borrow in 
their own currency, which means that they are continuously exposed to problems that 
triggered the crisis in 1997. Smaller economies such as in Sub-Saharan Africa are more 
vulnerable to capital movements that result in financial volatility and destabilization of 
domestic bank credit. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
108 A. Cornford, The  WTO negotiations  on  financial  services : current issues  and  future  directions, Paper for the Financial 
Markets Center, 2004, p. 14. 
109 Yung Chul Park, Kee Hong Bea, Financial liberalisation and integration in East Asia, in Financial stability and growth in 
emerging economies - The role of the financial sector, Ed J.J. Teunissen & M. Teunissen , The Hague, 2003, p. 186 
110 L.R. Reynoso, Argentina: la justicia inhibida, la Argentina de pie, in Correos para la emancipacion, nr. 234, 12 February 2004 
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2.1.6.2.16 GATS articles promote cross-border capital flows and capital account 
liberalization 
Some articles of the GATS agreement play a role in increasing the risks of destabilising 
financial flows related to foreign financial service providers.  
GATS Artircle XI.1.111 does not allow countries to restrict international transfers and 
payments for current financial transactions that are related to services in sectors that were 
liberalized under the Agreement. That means, first of all, that a country cannot prevent 
profit repatriation by Foreign Service providers in sectors in which a country has made 
GATS commitments.  
For instance, the EU requests from Chile in the current financial services negotiations 
that Chile eliminates the "restriction" that prior authorization by the Central Bank is 
required before transferring dividends from Chile abroad because this is in breach of 
Article XI. Thus, if a country has liberalized the financial sectors, foreign banks and 
insurance companies can transfer their profits abroad without reinvesting them in the 
country. In countries that have small economies and/or large foreign investors in all 
sectors, profit transfers affect negatively the balance of payments and exchange rate. In 
case of a financial crisis, its effects will be further emphasised by the inability of the local 
regulatory bodies to deal with the sudden and massive outflow of the profit transfers. 
Moreover, Art. XI.1. has a special effect in relation to financial services provided by 
foreign banks, insurers, investment bankers and asset managers which have established 
themselves in countries that made GATS commitments in these services (Mode 3). These 
financial service providers might view cross-border financial flows as "related to" or 
essential to their services in cases such as: 
• lending in foreign currency;  
                                                 
111 Art. XI.1.: ” Except under the circumstances envisaged in Article XII,"(see further below) "a Member shall not apply restrictions 
on international transfers and payments for current transactions relating to its specific commitments." 
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• buying securities abroad to balance the risks in pension fund management or to 
increase the rate of return of asset management services (e.g. mutual funds) for local 
clients or insurance companies;  
• providing investment bank services related to foreign stock exchanges (underwriting 
shares of domestic firms listed abroad) or related to foreign companies (acquisitions 
abroad);  
• offering international derivatives; and  
• using international credit risk mitigation mechanisms.  
Such cross-border capital flows can go beyond current account transfers and undermine 
management of the capital account aimed at avoiding financial instability and crises. If 
certain capital account restrictions frustrate the transactions of committed services 
sectors, they could be challenged under GATS XI. In countries that have already 
liberalized their capital account, GATS commitments in certain financial sub-sector will 
increase unstable capital flows. They might also discourage reversing capital account 
liberalisation where considered necessary to avoid financial crises. Developing countries 
that keep a high level of capital control are not likely to attract foreign financial firms as 
the latter avoid unpredictable local currency convertibility and capital withdrawals.112 In 
light of this, the question begs: Is the liberalization of financial services industry in 
Africa, envisaged by GATS provisions beneficial or detrimental to the African countries’ 
economies.  
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3.0 CHAPTER 3 
3.1 THE IMPACT OF GATS ON THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRIES OF 
THE EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES: A COMPARISON WITH AFRICA 
An assessment of the expected impact of GATS on the financial industry in Africa can be 
carried out by engaging in a comparison of the impact of GATS liberalization on the East 
Asian countries. Emphasis will be laid on the East Asia financial crisis, which was said 
by some experts to have been caused by the liberalization of the East Asian financial 
markets under the auspices of GATS. Firstly focus will be on the pre- 1997 GATS 
commitments by the East Asian countries. This will be followed by an examination of the 
post 1997 GATS commitments made by the East Asian countries. The countries that will 
be the representative sample for the countries under study in this chapter are Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines. China will come in later in the chapter as a country 
that has made commitments to the GATS in the post 1997 period. The purpose of 
focusing on China is to look at measures it has taken to avoid a financial crisis similar to 
the East Asian financial crisis as a result of liberalization of its finance industry.  
3.1.1 Indonesia 
3.1.1.1 Banking: The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the general policy 
framework governing banks, including the rules and regulations on the conditions of 
establishment of banks in Indonesia. However, international negotiations with respect to 
market access are carried out jointly with Bank Indonesia, which is responsible for the 
daily supervision of banks and prudential control.113 Thus, while the Ministry of Finance 
has complete jurisdiction over the licensing (or withdrawal of licenses) of banks, the 
decision is subject to the letters of recommendation of Bank Indonesia.114 African 
countries that are in the financial industry liberalization negotiations should make a note 
of this. The Central bank is the organ that is most familiar with the operations in the 
banking sector and can best inform the negotiators on the commitments that will be 
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favorable to a country. The Central Bank of a country is able to decipher the expected 
impact of any proposed commitments on the country’s banking sector.  
As a part of its financial sector liberalization, the banking sector in Indonesia began a 
process of deregulation in 1988 wherein foreign banks were allowed to operate in the 
form of joint ventures, with minimum Indonesian equity of 15 percent, or via the 
acquisition of a maximum equity share of 49 percent through an existing listed local bank 
in the stock market. These joint ventures were granted national treatment in the sense that 
they could engage in the same commercial operations as locally owned banks. 
Nonetheless, restrictions continue to be imposed on the number and location of branches, 
initially set at one per large city, as well as on the presence of natural persons (these 
limitations were reflected in Indonesia's GATS 1994 and 1995 Schedules). The banking 
sector in Indonesia witnessed a rapid expansion in the early 1990s; the number of banks 
approximately doubled while branches tripled.  
However, in the early 1990s, there were concerns about the soundness and safety of the 
banking system in Indonesia, with the increasing share of non-performing loans in total 
lending for state-owned banks. The 1997-98 regional financial crisis hit Indonesia 
particularly hard, resulting in the virtual decimation of the banking sector115. The 
emphasis has since been on restructuring the sector116.  
Indonesia improved upon its GATS commitments under the FSA (the fifth Protocol to the 
GATS) concluded in December 1997 and undertook further supplementary commitments 
in the context of the IMF programme in January 1998. 
These new GATS and IMF commitments include: (i) enhancing foreign participation in 
existing joint venture banks and increase by one the number of branches operated by 
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foreign-owned banks and joint-venture banks in Indonesia's main cities117; (ii) 
eliminating the economic needs test that was hitherto applied to the presence of natural 
persons and removing limitations on national treatment pertaining to capital requirements 
of foreign joint ventures; (iii) removing restrictions on foreign ownership in listed banks 
by June 1998 and allow foreign investors to increase (up to 100 percent) its ownership of 
a listed local bank and further; and (iv) revoking restrictions on branching, to allow 
foreign banks and joint-venture banks to operate nation-wide, with unlimited number of 
offices and branches. 
A Lesson for Africa 
Indonesia has imposed restrictions on the number and location of branches of foreign 
banks. African nations that have not fully liberalized their financial industry should also 
impose some restrictions in terms of ownership and operations on Foreign Service 
providers getting into their markets. These restrictions are particularly important to 
ensure the sequenced, gradual and ordered transition from a controlled economy to a fully 
liberalized one. 
3.1.1.2 Insurance: The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the general policy 
framework, supervision, regulation and licensing of new companies in the insurance 
sector in Indonesia. All insurance products are to be supplied through a locally 
incorporated insurance company that may be either Indonesian or foreign owned, except 
for products not available in the Indonesian market. Foreign commercial presence in 
Indonesia in the insurance service sector can take place via a joint venture with an 
Indonesian firm or through participation in the capital of a listed company. 
As at mid-1997, there were 103 general insurance companies in Indonesia, including 18 
joint ventures with foreign participation, and 58 life insurance companies, including 17 
joint ventures. Prior to the FSA, foreign ownership in joint ventures was restricted to 80 
percent and to 40 percent in a listed company, and restrictions on intra-corporate 
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movement of personnel and discriminatory capital requirements were in existence. 
However, under the Fifth Protocol to the GATS, Indonesia committed to the removal of 
ownership limits on foreign insurance companies and binding of up to 100 percent 
foreign ownership in domestic companies. Indonesia has also committed to promote 
greater flexibility in the movement of intra-corporate personnel for insurance companies 
and to the removal of remaining discriminatory capital requirements. 
A Lesson for Africa 
The more liberalized approach to its financial industry by Indonesia can be attributed to 
the financial crisis of 1997. Prior to 1997, foreign investors faced restrictions on entry 
into the Indonesian market. This made it easier for them (foreign entrants) to exit from 
the market on the onset of the crisis. The more liberalized post 1997 approach ensures 
that the foreign entrants have more at stake in the Indonesian market and are highly 
unlikely to make a quick exit. This lowers the risk of having foreign exchange and 
balance of payments problems. However, on a more precautionary note, with limited 
domestic ownership or lack of it, there’s a risk of unrestricted profit repatriation by the 
foreign owned companies. To counter this, African countries should come up with a 
sound domestic incentive framework; one that will motivate the foreign financial service 
providers to re-invest in the domestic markets.  
3.1.2 Malaysia118
3.1.2.1 Banking: All applications to provide any financial services including banking 
require the in-principle approval of the country’s central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM). The operation of banking institutions is overseen by the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1989, while the Islamic banks are governed by Islamic Banking Act 
1983. All foreign banks need to be locally incorporated to operate in Malaysia. Their 
parent banks are allowed to hold 100 percent interest in their Malaysian subsidiaries 
except for companies involved in insurance, fund management and securities brokerage. 
Foreign banks can extend loans only in partnership with domestic banks. Foreign banks 
                                                 
118 This section draws on information from WTO (1998a,b and 2001b). 
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are not allowed to establish new branches, including off-site ATMs. Although banking 
has remained the largest sub-sector, non-bank intermediaries have also been increasing 
their presence in Malaysia’s financial sector. 
As of June 2001, there were 27 commercial banks (including 2 Islamic banks), 12 finance 
companies, and 10 merchant banks licensed in Malaysia119, nearly half of which were 
foreign owned and controlled about a quarter of total assets, gross loans, and deposits in 
the commercial banking sector. 
There are significant restrictions on market access pertaining to commercial presence and 
hence foreign equity holdings in the financial service sector in Malaysia, depending upon 
the specific activity involved.120 Thus, financial companies involved in insurance, fund 
management, and securities brokerage are allowed up to 51 percent foreign equity and at 
least 30 percent equity from Bumiputras (indigenous Malays). A useful lesson is on the 
offing for African countries that are intent on liberalization of their financial service 
industry. African countries should ensure that the foreign entrants ensure sizeable 
domestic equity in their banks. This will reduce capital flight and in turn will reduce 
balance of payment and foreign exchange imbalances.   
However, for companies involved in finance/banking and venture capital, Bumiputras 
(indigenous Malays) must locally hold 70 percent of equity with at least 30 percent 
equity. 100 percent foreign ownership is permitted for those companies involved in asset 
management provided that the companies manage only foreign investors’ funds, else only 
70 percent of foreign equity is permitted. Similar restrictions apply to companies that are 
engaged in offering investment services to the companies other than those within the 
same group. 
 
                                                 
119 In 1995, there were 37 commercial banks, 40 finance companies, and 12 merchant banks licensed in Malaysia. No new banking 
licenses have been awarded since 1997 other than for offshore banking licenses. 
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A Lesson for Africa 
Local equity requirements have benefited the Malaysian economy and its people. The 
local people are able to participate in the local banking sector and local equity does stem 
capital outflows to foreign lands. This is because the locals choose to invest in their local 
economy. Therefore local equity requirements should be prioritized by African countries 
yet to make deep commitments to liberalize their financial services.  
3.1.2.2 Insurance: The insurance industry in Malaysia is regulated by the Insurance Act 
1996, and offshore insurance is regulated by the Offshore Insurance Act 1990. As in the 
case of Banking sector, the BNM is in charge of the overall supervision of the insurance 
sector. The Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority supervises offshore insurance 
activities. The Malaysian insurance industry regulatory machinery displays a more hands 
on role of the government to ensure stability of the sector and its benefits to the economy 
of the country. A striking example is the supervision of off shore financial services; an 
aspect that is absent in the previous case study of Indonesia.  
The insurance sector in Malaysia comprises life and general insurance, insurance brokers, 
adjusters, and registered agents. According to the latest available data, out of 63 insurers, 
23 were foreign owned. Foreign shares accounted for 72 percent and 36 percent of total 
life and general premium, respectively.121 As at December 2000 there were 83 offshore 
insurance as well as insurance-related companies in Labuan. Entry of foreign insurers 
into the Malaysian insurance market is currently allowed through investment in existing 
insurance companies that are subject to an aggregate foreign shareholding limit of 30 
percent.122 For existing joint venture companies in the insurance business, foreign 
shareholders that were the original owners of the companies are allowed to own up to 51 
percent of the total shares. For the insurance sector as a whole, foreign equity ownership 
of up to 51 percent is permitted with at least 30 percent of Bumiputra held equity. As of 
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October 2000, 7 new licenses for non-life reinsurance business and 1 license for life 
reinsurance business were issued to foreign reinsurers since 1995. In July 1999, BNM 
invited applications for 6 licenses for professional life reinsurance business offered under 
Malaysia's GATS Schedule. Apart from these regulations, the industry itself practices 
self-regulation through market agreements, rules and codes issued by the four mandatory 
associations representing general insurers, life insurers, insurance brokers, and loss 
adjusters.123
Malaysia has attempted to liberalize the financial services sector in a graduated and 
progressive manner under the GATS framework. As part of its membership commitments 
to the WTO, Malaysia signed and ratified the Financial Services Agreement that 
encompassed financial services. Malaysia has not made any horizontal commitments 
covering cross-border supply and consumption abroad124. Its commitments to permit 
commercial presence have generally been limited to joint ventures in which the 
maximum foreign equity permitted is 15 percent by a single or grouped foreign interest or 
to an aggregate foreign interest of 30 percent (though holding of more than 30 percent 
foreign equity may be allowed on a case-by-case basis). National treatment provisions are 
in place for all land and real estate related transactions with tax incentives and 
preferences offered to Bumiputras.125
A Lesson for Africa  
It is therefore evident that Malaysia has adopted an ordered and gradual liberalization 
process that ensures equity ownership by the locals (Bumiputras). This is a way of 
ensuring that the local people benefit from the liberalization process. This ensures 
sustainable economic growth that is not easily eroded by the withdrawal of the foreign 
owners from the market. Malaysia also has a more detailed supervisory and regulatory 
mechanism, thus ensuring a close monitoring of the financial services industry. This 
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makes it possible for the supervisory bodies to detect irregularities and to anticipate 
financial crises and to deal with the same if it is already affecting the economy.  This is 
an approach that African countries should consider while keeping in mind the uniqueness 
in their markets.  
3.1.3 Philippines126
3.1.3.1 Banking: The Philippines central bank, the Bangkok Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP), 
is responsible for controlling and supervising the financial services sector in the country. 
Although reforms were introduced in the financial sector in the Philippines in the 1980s, 
restrictions on entry into the banking sector stymied competition. It was only in the 1990s 
that controls on branching and entry of new banks in the financial system was relaxed. 
The BSP passed the Republic Act (R.A.) 7721 in 1994 that allowed for the entry and 
scope of operations of foreign banks in the country. Thus, the number of branches of 
foreign banks operating in the country grew from 4 to 14 by 1997. These new banks were 
permitted entry either as a branch or a subsidiary only if they ranked among top 5 banks 
according to their assets, in their home countries, or were ranked among the top 150 
banks in the world127. Another 4 foreign banks were allowed to establish subsidiaries 
and/or purchase up to 60 percent of the voting stock of existing banks. These measures 
resulted in an expansion of the operating network of the financial system in the country, 
and by 1999, banking institutions in the Philippines accounted for 41 percent of the total 
financial institutions operating in the country.128
Such liberalization measures in the early 1990s, coupled with the deregulation of the 
foreign exchange market in 1992, attracted large amounts of foreign capital inflows, most 
of which was directed into the real estate sector, creating an asset “bubble” which 
ultimately adversely affected the economy during the financial crisis in East Asia in 
1997-98. As with other regional economies, the pursuance of financial liberalization by 
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the Philippines without the prior institution of an effective regulatory or supervisory 
framework was one of the root causes behind its vulnerability to the crisis129.  
In response to this, the BSP has concentrated significantly on improving upon the 
regulatory and supervisory framework for banking operations in the country, as well as 
enhancing their competitiveness through privatization and modernization of banking 
facilities. As part of it, capital adequacy requirements have been raised, rules for non-
compliance have been strengthened, and an early intervention mechanism for possible 
bank failures has been adopted. Steps are also underway to strengthen the legal and 
regulatory systems related to corporate governance and restructure financial institutions 
and bankruptcy laws130. For the African countries that have liberalized their financial 
services industry, without the necessary regulatory apparatus, the way forward is to 
strengthen the supervisory body as evidenced by Philippines.  
As part of its horizontal commitments under GATS for financial services liberalization, 
the Philippines has restricted the participation of foreign investors, which is limited to 
proportionate share of foreign capital invested. It has, however, committed to maintain a 
minimum foreign equity participation level of 40 percent. 
These requirements were maintained even in areas where the Constitution has allowed as 
much as 100 percent foreign equity participation. In 1994, it raised the foreign ownership 
limit in banking sector to 60 percent, although foreign participation in Philippine owned 
banks were restricted to 30 percent. Under the FSA of 1997, the Philippines made 
commitments to allow up to 51 percent foreign equity ownership for banks. 
A Lesson for Africa 
A vital lesson for African countries stands out. African countries seeking to liberalize 
their financial services industry should first of all strengthen their regulatory and 
                                                 
129 Gochoco-Bautista, M. (1999). “The Past Performance of the Philippine Banking Sector and Challenges in the Post-crisis Period”, 
in “Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets: Philippines”, Asian Development Bank: Manila. 
 
130 See 129 above 
 70
supervisory apparatus of the financial services industry. This will go a long way in 
averting or reducing the effects of any financial crisis that may threaten to occur.   
3.1.3.2 Insurance: The insurance sector in the Philippines comprises two government 
owned institutions, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social 
Securities system (SSS), along with a few other government and private insurance 
companies. The Insurance commission is the main regulatory agency overseeing the 
activities in the insurance market. The market is heavily reliant on reinsurance, with 
almost half of the assets of insurance companies being invested in government securities, 
stocks and bonds.131
Since 1991, banks have been allowed to have an ownership stake of up to 35 percent in 
an insurance company. Foreign commercial presence in this sector is yet to be 
significantly established, although the government allowed up to 40 percent foreign 
ownership in insurance companies in the early 1990s. However, under the FSA, the 
Philippines agreed to increase the limit of foreign ownership in insurance companies to 
51 percent from 1999. With the allowance of foreign banks to own a stake of up to thirty 
five percent (35%) of an insurance company, foreign entrants are able to increase their 
dominance of the financial services sector by having a stake in both the banking and the 
insurance sectors. This means that domestic firms will face stiffer competition, gain less 
profits and the possibility of them running a loss and finally collapsing becomes more of 
a reality.   
3.1.4 Thailand132
3.1.4.1 Banking: The Bank of Thailand (BOT) is responsible for regulation and 
supervision of the commercial banking sector in Thailand under the Commercial Banking 
Act of 1962 (last revised in 1992). In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the 
government has been opening up this sector to foreign investment in order to attract 
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foreign capital and expertise, and enhance competition in this sector133. Thus, Thailand's 
banking sector has been undergoing a period of intense consolidation134. The number of 
banks was expected to decrease from 15 to 13 at the end of the consolidation process.135
With regard to cross-border supply and consumption abroad, there have been no changes 
in Thailand’s market-access commitments in the financial sector save insurance. These 
remain unbound with the possible exception of financial advisory services and financial 
data processing. 
With regard to commercial presence, no limitations are placed on representative offices 
of banks. Thus, 21 foreign banks operated fully licensed branches in Thailand in mid-
1999, up from 14 in 1995, while 15 foreign bank branches operated as offshore 
International Banking Facilities (IBFs) in Thailand under specified terms and conditions. 
Foreign bank branches are subject to certain operational restrictions. In principle they can 
operate up to three branches, but in practice, none of the foreign banks have yet been 
granted approval to open more than one branch. 
According to the authorities, there has not been any demand for licenses to open 
additional branches, notably as four local banks have been put up for sale. A limited 
number of foreign personnel allowed per foreign bank office are allowed and is governed 
by a specific set of conditions. Locally incorporated banks in Thailand enjoy a significant 
advantage over their foreign counterparts, as they are not limited in the number of 
branches. This implies that the Foreign Service providers are able to have a wider reach 
to customers in the country. This is a lesson to African countries that are yet to make a 
commitment on the number of branches that foreign banks are allowed to have in the host 
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country. African governments should restrict them to reduce their dominance in their 
local market.   
Following legislative amendments in 1997, foreign investors are now allowed to hold up 
to 100 percent of shares in commercial banks, finance, and “credit foncier” companies for 
a period of ten years, and thereby operate locally incorporated banks136. 
Thereafter, foreign investors will not be obliged to divest their holdings but may not 
purchase additional shares until the proportion of total foreign shareholding falls to 
within 49 percent. Foreign banks that purchase a majority share in a local bank are 
allowed to continue operating that bank under the rules pertaining to locally incorporated 
banks. The amendments of 1997 also maintain the requirement that maximum foreign 
equity participation should remain limited to up to a quarter of paid-up registered capital, 
and that the combined shareholding of an individual and related persons should not 
exceed 5 percent of a bank's paid-up registered capital, and that at least three fourths of 
the directors are of Thai nationality. However, the Minister of Finance may relax any of 
the above conditions for a particular bank if deemed suitable at its discretion. .  A similar 
decree was also issued concerning finance companies and credit foncier companies.  
A Lesson for Africa 
Many African economies are characterized by political patronage, manipulation and 
corruption. If an African country takes up the Thai model of the Minister of Finance 
having the discretion to relax specific conditions for foreign entry into the market, these 
said conditions may be prone to abuse. The liberalization commitments taken up by 
African countries should not be subject to waiver by the decision of an individual.  
3.1.4.2 Insurance: The Ministry of Commerce in Thailand is the main regulatory body 
for overseeing the activities of the insurance sector. Thailand adopted a three-stage 
approach to the liberalization of the insurance industry from 1997. In the first stage, 25 
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percent of foreign equity participation in domestic insurance companies was allowed and 
approval granted for setting up 25 new insurance licenses, out of which 12 were in the 
life-insurance business, and 13 were engaged in non-life insurance business. As a second 
stage, foreign equity participation is expected to be allowed up to 49 percent of registered 
share capital. In the third stage, foreign equity is allowed beyond the 49 percent limit 
after appropriate legal institutions are in place and have been in effect for five years.137
Foreign insurance companies have played a significant role in the Thai insurance market, 
accounting for nearly half of total direct premia in the life insurance sector (as of mid 
2001). Foreign insurance companies are able to sell life insurance policies to Thai 
residents, reflecting a high degree of liberalization of this sector.138
However, there are limitations on national treatment for life insurance services, with life 
insurance premia being tax deductible up to 10,000 baht only for holders of policies that 
are issued by locally licensed companies, that may be either domestically or foreign 
owned. Cross-border supply of non-life insurance services has remained unbound, except 
for international marine, aviation, and transit, together with all classes of reinsurance in 
Thailand’s insurance service sector. Market access conditions for intermediaries and 
suppliers of auxiliary services have not changed, viz. a branch of a foreign insurance 
company cannot conduct the business of insurance brokerage and insurance agent; while 
foreign commercial presence remains limited to twenty five (25) percent of equity.139
Apart from the initial commitments made by Thailand in 1993 under the GATS, new 
commitments on Financial Services agreed to in July 1995 with respect to insurance, 
banking and other financial services have been made through the Second Protocol to the 
GATS (the so-called Interim Agreement) and via the WTO’s FSA concluded in 
December 1997 in its Schedule annexed to the Fifth Protocol. This also included the 
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elimination of the MFN exemption of according differential treatment of other members 
on a reciprocal basis. 
The above experiences of financial services liberalization in the four middle income 
economies among the Southeast Asian countries indicates that both Indonesia as well as 
Thailand have been active in opening up their respective banking and insurance sectors to 
competitive market forces. This is indicated in their improved market access 
commitments in the Financial Services Agreement in 1997 (which was concluded during 
the onset of the financial crisis in both these countries), compared to their initial offers 
under the GATS schedule in 1994-95.140 It is evident that the crisis was a major factor in 
hastening the pace of multilateral financial services liberalization under GATS in the two 
countries. Although Malaysia was also adversely affected by the crisis, its current 
financial services regime in some cases appears more restrictive to foreign competition 
and commercial presence, compared to the other neighboring economies. Despite the 
need to encourage foreign investment, African countries should adopt the Malaysian 
approach that is a more measured and restrictive approach to making GATS 
commitments in Financial Services. This is because the financial industry regulatory 
bodies will be able to deal with any financial crisis that occurs since the liberalization 
will not be drastic and therefore its effects can be easily handled. This approach also 
enables the governments to make more informed decisions on whether to liberalize 
further or not.141   
As with a number of other countries, these countries have bound their multilateral 
obligations at less than status quo. The binding of commitments below status quo is a 
reflection of governments’ dual objectives of trying to encourage foreign investments 
into the financial sector while simultaneously avoiding a repeat of the turmoil and 
instability following the premature and ill-sequenced liberalization prior to the regional 
crisis of 1997-98, not to mention providing some degree of protection to the incumbent 
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national suppliers from immediate competition.142 This said, all the countries, especially 
Thailand, have continued to take important steps towards the de facto relaxation foreign 
equity limitations. There appears to be a clear policy preference for promoting foreign 
equity investments (ownership/divestment) over the promotion of market competition.143
With regard to the insurance sector, entry limitations have been accompanied by 
restrictions on foreign equity. There appears to be a relatively greater willingness to 
undertake more liberal commitments in the banking than the insurance sector, and there 
has been a relatively greater willingness on the part of these countries to commit to 
liberal consumption abroad than to cross-border supply. 
3.2 The East Asian Financial Crisis 
The role of liberalization in the East Asian financial crisis must be underscored. Attention 
must be paid to the liberalization regime in East Asia and its contribution to the East 
Asian financial crisis. Therefore, one of the most common assertions within this section 
is that recent liberalization of the domestic financial sector is found to significantly 
increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Failures of the banking sector in East Asia during the last decade have been spectacular. 
The Economist magazine estimated the cost of the Indonesian banking crisis to that 
country’s taxpayers at US$75 billion, and quoted an analyst who called it “the most 
expensive bail-out in world history.”144 Recent episodes of banking crises in Asia are 
listed in Table 1. Apparent is both the prevalence of the problem in the region and its 
very heavy cost. 
The fiscal cost to taxpayers of the Thai banking crisis (1997–2002), for example, was 
estimated to be a staggering 35 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). That amounts 
to about three-and-a-half years of total government consumption or more than two years 
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of total government revenues from taxes, tariffs, and other income sources.145 Equally 
similar financial sector crises in other geographical regions. 
In recent years, much research comparing crises in a variety of countries has attempted to 
construct early warning systems or consider the causes of banking crises—countrywide 
failures in the banking sector— especially in developing countries. This research has 
empirically identified a set of economy-wide, financial, and microeconomic measures 
that predict the occurrence of banking crises or enable estimation of their probable 
costs.146  
The two leading hypotheses used in academic circles to explain the relationship between 
financial liberalization and banking crises in developing countries are herein referred to 
as the “lax supervision” and the “monopoly power” hypotheses. Understanding the 
relative importance of these two possible pathways from liberalization to crisis should 
provide policymakers with insights that may help avert future banking crises in Asia and 
elsewhere. The discussion that follows attempts to distill general patterns about 
liberalization and crises in nondeveloped countries. 
Country-specific details are not included, so any attempt to derive country-specific 
conclusions should incorporate examination of the relevant case.147
3.2.1 Financial Liberalization and Crises 
A pre-liberalized banking-financial sector is typically one in which only a small number 
of domestic banks operate. Foreign banks, and sometimes even new domestic ones, 
cannot enter the market because of a complicated licensing requirement or outright 
prohibition on foreign ownership of banks. There is usually also a ceiling on the interest 
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rate that banks are allowed to offer depositors so as to prevent competition among banks 
operating in a particular geographical region. Sometimes other interest rates, such as for 
loans and mortgages, are also specified by regulatory authorities and are not determined 
by markets. 
Often, there are also restrictions placed on the geographical or functional areas in which 
banks are allowed to operate. In some cases, these institutions are not allowed to sell 
insurance, investments, consulting, or other services. Another typical characteristic of 
preliberalized banking sectors is that government often plays a central role. The banks 
may operate as oligopolies with implicit government support. In other cases, the 
government itself may own all or many of the banks and therefore have an explicit stake 
in the profitability and stability of the sector. 
While this is the general state of preliberalized banking sectors, considerable variation is 
found across the countries of Asia. In some, many small domestic, banks operate, while 
in others only a very limited number of banks are allowed. Other differences in the 
trajectory of liberalization, in addition to differences in the initial state of the sector, can 
also be observed. 
A complete liberalization of the domestic financial banking sector will entail the removal 
of all the restrictions discussed above. In a fully liberalized sector, banks are not 
restricted in their scope of operations nor are they restricted in their geographical location 
or ownership. Interest rates are determined by the demand and supply of deposits and 
loans. In most Asian countries that have liberalized, some forms of restrictions typically 
remain even after the liberalization, most notably in restrictions on functional areas of 
operation or in the degree of government involvement in the sector. 
3.2.2 ‘Lax Supervision’ and ‘Monopoly Power’ Pathways 
Financial liberalization implies a change in the rules and regulations under which banks 
operate. It also forces bank managers to manage risk in a new environment —one in 
which they are not yet familiar with the consequences of their decisions. In a pre-
liberalized financial sector, the government—typically through the central bank—
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regulates and prevents excessive risk taking. But, following liberalization, these 
regulatory constraints and their enforcement through supervisory practices may no longer 
be viable. The changing environment may render insufficient the already limited capacity 
of regulators to understand the banks’ balance sheets.148
Under this scenario, financial liberalization will enable risk-taking behavior and a 
consequent crisis if it is not accompanied by new rules and regulations and capable 
enforcement to monitor the risk taking behavior. If, on the other hand, an adjusted 
supervisory framework is put in place, excessive risk taking will not occur and financial 
liberalization is unlikely to have adverse effects on the stability of the banking sector. 
This is due to the ability of a regulatory body to detect events that may lead to instability 
in the banking sector. The regulatory body is then able to take measures to counter the 
adverse effects. The Philippines is said to have suffered a financial crisis due to the lack 
of an effective regulatory body.  
In spite of the prevalence of discussion of this “lax supervision” pathway in academic and 
policy literature, there is almost no available evidence supporting its validity as a 
pathway to crisis. An alternative pathway, one less commonly considered, relates to the 
degree of monopoly power that a pre-liberalized banking sector enjoys.149
In a pre-liberalized sector, existing banks typically experience considerable monopoly 
power. Competition is limited to a small number of licensed domestic banks and they are 
not allowed to compete on the interest rates they offer depositors and charge to 
borrowers. 
Liberalization of domestic interest rates, therefore, shrinks profit margins as banks start 
competing by increasing deposit rates and decreasing lending rates. 
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At the same time, the entry of foreign banks presents domestic banks with increased 
competition for customers. 
As competition between new foreign banks and profitable domestic banks intensifies, 
institutions that use their resources less efficiently face large losses and, ultimately, 
bankruptcy. The resulting decrease in profits also puts banks in a more vulnerable 
position in the presence of adverse macroeconomic shocks.150
Under this scenario, systemic problems in the banking sector are an almost inevitable 
result of financial liberalization. A crisis might occur even if liberalization is 
accompanied by proper regulation and its enforcement. This therefore means that even 
though liberalization of the financial services industry in African countries is 
accompanied by proper domestic supervision and regulation, a financial crisis might still 
occur.151  
The argument that the “monopoly power” pathway is independent from the institutional 
arrangements that regulate and supervise the financial system enables empirical 
differentiation between the two channels. 
Emphasis on the first pathway (“lax supervision”) suggests that liberalization should be 
undertaken only once effective supervision is in place, while the second (“monopoly 
power”) casts doubt on the wisdom of the liberalization program itself. Going by the 
arguments propounded under the monopoly power pathway, African countries are highly 
likely to face a financial crisis if they do liberalize their financial services industries even 
if they have in place proper supervisory and regulatory bodies to oversee the operation of 
the financial services sector.152 The competition faced by the local African financial 
institutions from the more efficient foreign financial service providers will lead to them 
(local financial institutions) facing a decrease in profits and a higher probability to make 
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losses. These local institutions, which previously had monopoly power, may eventually 
collapse leading to a financial crisis.  
3.2.3 Assessing Importance of the Pathways  
In order to assess the relative importance of lax supervision versus monopoly power in 
creating banking crises, Noy I. (2005)153 developed an empirical model of the probability 
of the occurrence of banking crises.154
The model estimates quantitative probabilities for of banking crises. By differentiating 
the two channels through the regulation and supervision component, estimation of the 
importance of each pathway became feasible.155
The model requires measuring both domestic liberalization and the strength of the 
supervisory regime. 
The domestic financial liberalization measure used denotes the presence or absence of 
interest rate control on bank deposits. This is the most commonly used measure for 
liberalization, as interest rate decontrol is usually one of the most significant steps in the 
liberalization process. 
The strength of the supervisory regime is not directly observable for two reasons: first, it 
depends on the legal framework in place and its enforcement and second, because 
governments are typically and understandably reluctant to provide any information that 
will show weakness in the governing institutions. Noy I. (2005)156 thus resorted to three 
alternative proxies for the strength of the supervisory regime.157
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The first proxy is a measure of the degree of corruption taken from Transparency 
International, as corruption is associated with the extent of enforcement of rules and with 
the degree of corruptibility of inspectors. For the second alternative, an annual 
assessment of the state of political freedom published by Freedom House was used, as the 
existence of effective supervision is most likely also dependent on the presence of a free 
press and freedom of expression.158
A third proxy measures the independence of the central bank from political interference. 
An independent authority is assumed to be more likely to enforce the governing rules. 
Banking supervisory bodies often reside within the central bank and even if they do not, 
the degree of independence of the central bank is correlated with the degree of 
independence from political interference of the supervisory agency. The data used 
covered the years 1975–1997 for the 61 non-developed countries for which at least 10 
years of consecutive GDP, banking crises, and liberalization data were available. 
An obvious observation from this data is that almost all banking crises occurred when 
there was no interest rate control (liberalized markets) and most of these took place 
within a few years of the liberalization itself. 
Of the 47 banking crisis episodes studied, only 11 occurred in pre-liberalized sectors and 
27 occurred within the five years immediately following liberalization. 
In direct contrast to what is perceived by many academics, policymakers, and regulators, 
the “monopoly power” pathway appears more important than the “lax supervision” 
pathway in the short term. For a longer horizon (3–5 years), there is weaker evidence that 
a combination of domestic liberalization with lax supervision by the authorities may yield 
a significant increase in the likelihood of financial crises.159
These results suggest that the “monopoly power” hypothesis deserves more serious 
attention. Nevertheless, arguing that “lax supervision” is unimportant, as a source of 
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danger in the immediate aftermath of financial liberalization, is most certainly not 
warranted. 
An interesting possibility is that the narrowing of the bank monopolies’ profit margins 
(the “monopoly power” hypothesis) is an immediate result of liberalization and therefore 
an immediate threat to the health of the banking industry. In contrast, the increased risk 
taking that might result from liberalization combined with insufficient regulation and 
supervision (the “lax supervision” hypothesis) is dangerous, but only for a longer time-
horizon. It can cause banking sector instability that will become evident years later. It is 
therefore prudent to note that African countries should put in place mechanisms to deal 
with financial crises that are caused by the monopoly power pathway in the short term 
and then go ahead to set up supervisory and regulatory bodies to deal with financial crises 
in the long term.  
The conclusions have implications for East Asia and particularly for China. African 
countries can in turn draw and learn from these implications as they liberalize their 
financial industry.  
3.2.4 Prudential Supervision of Banks and Financial Liberalization 
Although the onset of financial liberalization seems to be a significant destabilizing force 
for the financial industry, there appears to be professional consensus that, in the long run, 
a liberalized financial market will be stabilizing, will channel investment and saving 
more productively, will enable maintenance of steady consumption levels, and will be 
conducive to more rapid and sustainable growth.160 In view of these long-term benefits, 
and however one evaluates the importance of each of the two hypotheses to the 
relationship between liberalization and crises, it is clear that there is still a distinct role for 
liberalization and a banking supervisory agency. This is especially true for the economies 
of African countries that are mostly known to be fragile.  
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A supervisory agency should regulate banks activities and provide insurance to small 
depositors. This is necessary in order to prevent the instability that inevitably results even 
in pre-liberalized financial sectors. 
Regulatory practices should include: development and maintenance of honest and 
impartial legal systems; mandating strict information disclosure practices; establishment 
of limits on the rate at which banks can lend or on the rate of increase in their exposure to 
riskier sectors (so-called “speed bumps”); requiring diversification of bank portfolios; 
strict capital and liquidity standards that account for different degrees of risk exposures; 
strict and transparent accounting of non-performing loans; and rigorous mandatory 
balance sheet adjustment once a loan is determined to be non-performing. 
3.3 The East Asian Banking Crisis 
Notable case studies are the banking crises that hit East Asia in 1997–1998. All the East 
Asian countries that suffered a drastic depreciation of their currency (a currency crisis) 
during that turmoil also experienced systemic banking sector failure. A recent study of 
the evolution of the overall East Asian crisis, which was accompanied by large-scale 
banking problems,161 supports the suggestion made here that the decrease in monopoly 
power may play the most important role in the emergence of a financial crisis following 
liberalization. For example, the study found that during the East Asian crisis, foreign-
owned banks were less likely to get into a liquidity crisis and none of the foreign-owned 
financial institutions were shut down. Furthermore, the institutions that were connected 
with industrial groups or influential families were more likely to be distressed during the 
crisis. Additional support comes from a study showing that foreign-owned banks tend to 
have higher profit margins and, more significantly, that foreign presence is correlated 
with lower profit margins for domestically owned banks in developing countries.162
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Table 2 shows the years in which various liberalizing actions took place in the five East 
Asian countries that were hit most severely by the crisis: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. It appears that the sequence of liberalizations was different in 
each of these countries and that no single liberalizing act can be clearly associated with 
the crisis.  
Three observations are noteworthy. First, banking sectors in the East Asian countries are 
now generally more concentrated, more foreign-owned, and face more restrictions on 
their areas of operations. 
Second, the legal powers accorded to auditors have increased. Third, the amount of non-
performing loans, as a percent of total assets, has decreased in all these countries. In 
reporting the results of a recent survey, the International Monetary Fund noted, “[Asian] 
Banks…have to varying degrees increased provisioning and write-offs to strengthen their 
balance sheets…. However, significant vulnerabilities persist in the banking systems in a 
number of countries faced with high levels of distressed assets, under provisioned bad 
loans, and significant exposure to interest rate increases.”163 Interestingly, Korea 
appeared to have reformed its banking sector the most. Yet, even in the case of Korea, 
there is some doubt about the efficacy of these changes as long as the primary 
institutional arrangements remain the same, with the supervisory authorities subservient 
to the policy-making body within the government.164
These conclusions underscore the fact that economists are still far from a consensus on 
the likely mechanism that led to the East Asian financial crisis and particularly the 
banking sector failures. Much of the theoretical work done to date on the dynamics of the 
Asian crisis has not dealt with the impact of domestic financial liberalizations. The 
majority of the empirical work has focused on the financial flows engendered by 
                                                 
163  International Monetary Fund. 2005. Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues, p. 58 
164 For such a pessimistic interpretation of the recent reforms in Korea, see Lee, C.H. 2004. Post-Crisis Financial Reform in 
Korea: A Critical Appraisal. Korea Development Institute Manuscript 
 85
international (rather than domestic) financial liberalization and the evident globalization 
of international capital markets throughout the 1990s.165
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 For discussion on the increasing volumes of international financial flows, see Aizenman, J. and I. Noy. 2003. “Endogenous 
Financial Openness: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper No. 10144. For the impact of international capital flow reversals in the Asian crisis, see Hutchison, M. and I. Noy. 2005. 
“Sudden Stops and the Mexican Wave.” Journal of Development Economics. Forthcoming 
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Table 1:On the Banking Crisis in East and South Asia (1980-2002) 
Country/economy Time-
frame 
Non-Performing 
Loans (% of total 
loans) 
Fiscal cost of 
crisis (% of 
annual GDP) 
Forgone 
output (% of 
annual GDP) 
BANGLADESH 1985-
1996 
20   
CHINA 1990- 50 47  
INDONESIA 1997-
2002 
70 55 39 
JAPAN 1991- 35 24 48 
KOREA 1997-
2002 
35 28 17 
MALAYSIA 1997-
2001 
30 16 33 
NEPAL 1988 29  2.2 
PHILIPPINES  1983-
1987 
19 3 26 
PHILIPPINES  1998- 20 13 10 
SRI LANKA  1989-
1993 
35 5 1 
TAIWAN 1997-
1998 
26 12  
THAILAND 1983-
1987 
 1 0 
THAILAND 1997-
2002 
33 35 40 
VIETNAM 1997 18  23 
Average for Asia (14 
episodes) 
1980-
2002 
32 22 22 
Average for the rest of 
the world (97 episodes)  
1980-
2002 
41 15 12 
     
     
Non-performing loans are defined as loans for which no scheduled repayments are being 
made. Fiscal cost is the cost to the government of paying depositors or other debtors for 
nationalized debt and recapitalization of banks. The output cost is calculated relative to 
potential output (according to the International Monetary Fund’s definition of this term). 
Blank spaces indicate data unavailable. 
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Source: Caprio, G. and D. Klingebiel. 1999. Episodes of Systemic and Borderline 
Financial Crises. Manuscript, The World Bank.Update available at: 
www.econ.worldbank.org
Table 2 Banking Crises and Liberalization Dates in East Asia 
Country  Banking 
Crisis 
Decontrol 
of 
Interest 
Rates 
Abolishing 
Direct 
Credit 
Increasing 
Competition
Allowing 
Capital 
Flows 
Privatisation Deregulation
Indonesia  1997-
2002 
1983 1983 1988  1996 1992 
Korea 1997-
2002 
1991 1982 1981 1996 1983 1988 
Malaysia 1997-
2001 
1991 1976 1985   1989 
Philippines 1998- 1983 1983 1993 1995 1995  
Thailand 1997-
2002 
1992 1980 1992 1992 1993 1993 
 
Source: Abiad, A. and A. Mody. 2005. “Financial Reform: What Shakes it? What Shapes 
it?” American Economic Review 95(1): 66–88. Blank spaces denote sectors either 
liberalized before 1980 or not yet liberalized. 
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3.4 China’s Commitment to Financial Liberalization 
A study of the liberalization path undertaken by China is important because of the lessons 
it has drawn from the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and the measures the country will 
undertake in order to avoid a financial crisis of its own.  
The stability and health of the Chinese banking sector is one of the biggest concerns 
regarding future economic policy in the region. A destabilized banking sector in China 
will most likely involve a deep recession and is thus a concern for China, its neighbors, 
and its trade partners. China has the biggest financial sector in developing East Asia, with 
a higher domestic credit-to-GDP ratio (a typical measure of the importance of an 
economy’s financial sector) than Korea, Japan, or the United States. Domestic currency 
deposits in deposit-taking institutions amount to 178 percent of GDP. Four state-owned 
banks, all of them possibly insolvent by international accounting standards, dominate 
China’s banking sector. Accounting for more than 60 percent of total assets, these 
institutions are the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
The historical role of the big four was to provide government directed credit to state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Since many of the State Owned Enterprises are now virtually 
bankrupt, the banks have large portfolios of non-performing loans, which prevent them 
from allocating additional credit and improving performance. The four banks have 
already experienced several publicly funded capital infusions—most recently when 
US$15 billion was handed to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in April 
2005. Foreign funded banks still account for less than 1.5 percent of total assets in the 
Chinese banking sector, although a number of large foreign financial institutions have 
bought substantial shares in the big four during the last couple of years.166
The Chinese government has embarked upon a process of liberalization and opening up 
of the banking sector as part of the commitments undertaken in the World Trade 
                                                 
166 For a recent detailed and informative International Monetary Fund review of the Chinese banking sector, see Barnett, S. 
2004. “Banking Sector Developments,” In Prasad, E. (ed.). “China’s Growth and Integration into the World Economy: 
Prospects and Challenges.” International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 232. Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund Press. 
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Organization (WTO) accession agreement (under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, or GATS). The government had pledged to fully open up the banking sector to 
international competition by December 2006. The banking sector went through 
significant reforms in December 2003 but is still far from liberalized. Most importantly, 
deposit rates are still set by law, competition on lending rates is still circumscribed, and 
foreign bank participation is heavily curtailed, and foreign ownership of any domestic 
bank is limited to a total of not more than 25 percent. 
Discussion of the two possible pathways that lead from liberalization to crisis raises a 
number of issues that are highly relevant to the imminent Chinese liberalization process 
imposed by the WTO-GATS agreement. 
Important questions include: (a) whether the institutional arrangements governing the 
newly founded regulatory agency are adequately robust to withstand liberalization; (b) 
whether the regulatory agency has the institutional knowledge and political power to 
successfully regulate a post-liberalized banking sector; (c) whether the banking sector’s 
profit margins are sufficiently wide and balance sheets healthy enough to withstand 
increasing competition from more profitable foreign banks. These are especially pertinent 
questions considering the previous painful and costly experiences in East Asia in 1997–
1998. 
The answers to these questions will be of vital importance to the health of the Chinese 
economy and the region in general in years to come. African countries can draw some 
useful lessons from China’s efforts to cope with liberalization of its financial services 
industry. This should however be done while taking into consideration the peculiarities of 
the Chinese market like its huge size.  
It is clear that the Chinese banking sector can be successfully liberalized and the danger 
of a banking crisis averted only if banks’ balance sheets are carefully monitored and the 
monopoly power enjoyed by the leading banks is dismantled slowly. This, of course, 
implies that the December 2006 deadline to finish the liberalization process was woefully 
inadequate.  
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A Lesson for Africa 
Extending this to Africa, it would be prudent for African negotiators in the Financial 
Services Negotiations for Liberalization of the Industry should always negotiate foe 
adequate time frames to enable their governments to comfortably ensure compliance with 
the commitments. This is because of the lack of the capacity of most African 
governments to quickly comply with the commitments. The adequate time frame comes 
in handy in ensuring proper regulatory and supervisory mechanisms are put in place. It 
also ensures that the monopoly power of the dominant players in the pre-liberalized era is 
slowly dismantled. This is vital to ensure that then dominant domestic players facing stiff 
foreign competition do not control a large part of the financial services industry. Thus 
any losses they incur will not have an adverse effect on the economy.    
3.5 China, Her Financial Services Industry and GATS 
It is noteworthy to state that China presents a prudent and graduated approach to the 
liberalization of the financial industry under the auspices of GATS. It is vital to examine 
this approach adopted by China as a model for African countries in the liberalization of 
the financial sector. However, it must be noted that the commitments that have been 
made by China cannot be taken by African countries wholesomely due to the peculiarities 
of the Chinese financial market like its size and its phenomenal economic growth.  
China signed the GATS upon its WTO accession at the end of 2001. Although there is a 
phasing-out period of five years with respect to business scope (local currency vs. foreign 
exchange banking business), customers (resident vs. nonresident, consumer vs. firms), 
and geographic location, its overall commitment is relatively liberal compared with 
countries in East Asia and most of the developing economies. Even before its WTO 
commitments, foreign banks have already been allowed to operate in certain geographic 
areas with progressively liberalized scope of banking businesses. 
3.5.1 The impact of foreign banks on China’s interest rate liberalization: China’s 
interest rate liberalization essentially follows a standard textbook sequencing approach: 
Short-term rates are liberalized before long-term rates, lending rates before the borrowing 
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rates, and lending and deposit rates of foreign currency before that of domestic currency. 
Inter-bank rates and government bond rates are fully determined by markets. On January 
1 2004, bank-lending rates were allowed to fluctuate between 10 percent below and 170 
percent above the base one year lending rate set by the Central Bank. After October 29th 
2004, the limit on the upper bound of lending rate has been abolished. Although deposit 
rates are not yet fully liberalized, the deposit rates of large deposits can be negotiated 
between depositors and banks. The rationale of such a sequencing strategy appears to aim 
at protecting the franchise value of banks so as to avoid excessive competition for 
deposits among banks.167 This therefore ensures that there is no drastic fluctuation of 
interest rates and that banks will offer reasonable rates on deposits that they can afford to 
pay, thus avoiding profit reduction and eventual loss due to inability to pay interests for 
deposits.168  
A Lesson for Africa 
Africa can borrow from the interest rate liberalization model; adopted by the Chinese. 
The graduated and sequenced liberalization of the interest rates ensures that banks do not 
have excessive competition for deposits and therefore avoid making losses and going 
bankrupt due to offering high interests for customers deposits or very low interest rates 
on loans so as to attract borrowers. This in turn averts a financial crisis that is imminent 
when banks become bankrupt and collapse thus going down with the funds of many 
depositors.  
Foreign banks, because of their small RMB deposit base, have always been active 
participants169 of the inter-bank markets since 1998 and their participation has acted to 
help unify the national inter-bank market by breaking barriers of regional segmentation. 
One concrete case was in the early days of foreign entry in the interbank RMB market. 
Shanghai and Shenzhen are two major inter-bank market centers. 
                                                 
167 Li-Gang Liu (2005) The Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on China, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-024, 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) 
168 See 167 above 
169 Foreign banks’ net borrowing from the inter-bank market is about 8.2 percent of the inter-bank trading volume at the end of June 
2004. 
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To prevent excessive competition for businesses of foreign banks, the Bankers 
Association in Shenzhen reached an agreement that the RMB loan rates to foreign banks 
should not be below 20 percent of the average standard lending rate. However, the 
Shanghai inter-bank market center did not have such an anti-competition practice.170
Indeed, available data indicate that the inter-bank rates in Shanghai could go down as 
much as 36 percent in 2001171. As a result, foreign banks did most of the borrowing in 
the Shanghai market. Fearing of losing market shares to Shanghai, the Shenzhen 
Bankers’ Association eventually revoked the practice in 2002.172
3.5.2 Fee-Based Business: After China’s accession to the WTO by the end of 2001, 
foreign banks operating in China could immediately conduct foreign exchange business 
with Chinese depositors. Although foreign banks provide better services, customers 
would have to pay for such services, which were not entirely expected by Chinese 
customers. For example, Citibank in 2002 charged depositors $6 or 50 RMB monthly if 
the monthly average deposit of a customer is less than $5000 dollars.173
Other foreign banks such as HSBC and Bank of East Asia also had charges on deposits 
but of various forms. Domestic banks followed the examples of foreign banks quickly 
and started charging fees on foreign currency deposits. They then started to charge fees 
on ATM transactions across banking groups. With respect to the RMB business, domestic 
banks also innovated by providing differentiated services offered to their large depositors. 
Fee-based business, a vague area in China’s commercial bank regulation, caused many 
legal disputes between consumers and the banking sector.174 The regulatory authority 
then had to revise regulations on this issue by issuing a new rule to clarify the scope of 
the fee-based businesses that commercial banks are able to conduct. It finally recognized 
                                                 
170 Li-Gang Liu (2005) The Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on China, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-024, 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) 
171 See 170 above 
 
172 Liu, Li-Gang, “The Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on China,” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (RIETI) (September 2005), RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-024 
173 See 172 above 
174 Liu, Li-Gang, “The Impact of Financial Services Trade Liberalization on China,” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (RIETI) (September 2005), RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-024 
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the principle that fee-based business is legal with only limited exceptions. Commercial 
banks are granted the right to charge fees on their intermediation businesses. Certain 
prices of the fee-based businesses are regulated by the government, but the majority of 
them are determined by the market. Because of strong opposition from the consumer 
groups, a compromised solution was reached on the RMB deposits. Fees charged on 
foreign currency deposits remain. However, banks are not allowed to charge fees on the 
RMB deposits.175
 3.5.3 Impact on the scope of banking business: One important feature of China’s 
financial service trade liberalization agreement is that criteria for authorization to operate 
in China’s financial sector are based on prudential means alone and are not based on 
economic needs test or quantitative limits on licenses176. As a result, corresponding 
changes in regulation after the accession must be made. From 2002-2003, the bank 
supervisory authority has removed 26 bank businesses from the list that requires 
approval. One certain banking business are granted approval, the headquarters of a bank 
can decide whether its bank branch can conduct such business, without further approval 
from the regulatory authority. For those new categories of banking businesses that require 
approval from the regulatory authority, a decision should be made within 10 business 
days of filing of the application. Indeed, the WTO accession has sped up the converging 
process of the Chinese regulatory practices to the international standard. Transparency 
and efficiency have been improving. 
A Lesson for Africa 
An adoption of a less bureaucratic financial service industry regulatory framework by 
African countries will boost business because it will save time and money usually spent 
in getting approval to set up a financial institution. However, care must be taken to ensure 
that this less bureaucratic regulation does not have loop holes that will be exploited by 
the foreign entrants.   
                                                 
175 See 174 above 
176 See report of the Working Party on the accession of China, WTO October 2001. 
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3.5.4 Impact on financial regulation: The case of the financial holding company: 
China’s Commercial Bank Laws, modified in 2003, stipulates that commercial banks 
operating in China are prohibited from engaging in trust and securities business, investing 
in real restate business not for self use, and investing non-bank financial institutions and 
enterprises only with limited exceptions.177 Indeed, the Bank of China Group is one of 
such exceptions. It controls 3 commercial banks, 3 investment banks, 1 mutual fund, and 
2 insurance companies. However, large foreign banks operating in China are generally 
within a financial holding group and they are perceived to have unfair advantage over the 
Chinese banks.178 As a result, a new law on financial holding group is under discussion. 
In addition, because of foreign entry and the presence of its own financial holding groups, 
China has put great emphasis on cross-agency coordination and information sharing in its 
amended Central Bank and Commercial Bank Law. The newly established financial 
stability bureau is supposed to be in charge of such coordination. 
A Lesson for Africa 
African countries should limit the foreign financial service providers’ scope of operation 
like the Chinese government has. This will reduce the dominance of the foreign firms in 
the African markets. If the foreign firms are allowed to engage in both bank and 
insurance activities they will dominate the financial services industry and will eventually 
monopolize the same. African governments should ensure that the foreign firms’ scope of 
operation is clearly demarcated to limit the foreign firms to one sector of the financial 
industry. 
3.5.5 Impact on new entry into the financial sector and privatization of state owned 
commercial banks: Since 1996, the regulatory authority has authorized 112 city 
commercial banks and 4 rural commercial banks to be formed. Many of them were 
merged from city and rural cooperatives. If China can offer national treatment to foreign 
banks under its WTO obligations, how it should treat the entry of newly formed and 
                                                 
177 Article 35, section 2 of the Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2003. 
 
178 For example, foreign holding financial companies are viewed as “supermarket”, whereas Chinese commercial banks are viewed as 
“specialty” shops that lack economies of scale to compete with foreign entities (Huang, 2004). 
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privately owned banks has raised strong interests in recent years. The banking regulatory 
commission, instead of issuing more new banking licenses to allow domestic entry, has 
taken an approach to encouraging private investors to be equity shareholders of existing 
banks. Even if a privately owned Chinese bank applies for a banking license, the 
applicant will be required to have a foreign investor as a strategic partner. Based on the 
experiences of and lessons learned from emerging market and transition economies, 
private banks mushroomed after financial liberalization have failed in great numbers and 
eventually the tax payers would have to shoulder the losses. Therefore, the domestic 
entry should be treated with great care. 
In this sense, the current regulation is prudent. However, because of the lack of 
transparency on financial conditions of city commercial and state owned banks, private 
investors have been quite hesitant in becoming shareholders. They fear that their 
investments are going to be used to fill the holes of NPLs but at the same time, they 
cannot participate effectively in the decision making process because the state remains as 
the majority shareholder. Indeed, the privatization process of the big four state-owned 
commercial banks faces similar dilemma if the state is unwilling to yield its majority 
control on these banks. 
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4.0 CHAPTER 4 
4.1 THE ANTICIPATED IMPACT OF GATS ON THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 
A number of significant benefits arise from liberalizing trade in financial services. These 
include among others, strong positive effects on income and growth driven by 
specialization on the basis of comparative advantage, know how, and new technologies. 
Because liberalization improves financial intermediation, it enhances efficient sectoral 
inter-temporal and international allocation of resources. Trade liberalization in financial 
services has the potential of achieving the following179: 
• Inducing the government to improve macro-economic management, review policy 
intervention in credit and financial sector regulation and supervision;180 
• Provision of better quality and variety of financial services, enhancing 
competition and improvement of sectoral efficiency thus lowering costs 
• Improving financial intermediation and investment opportunities through 
improved resource allocation across sectors, countries and through better means 
of managing risks and absorbing shocks181 
• An efficient and well regulated financial services industry leads to an efficient 
transformation of savings and investments, ensuring that resources are deployed 
where they have the higher returns 182 
• Benefits arise from increased product variety and better risk sharing economy 
On the other hand, domestic financial services providers will face stiff competition from 
the well-funded foreign entrants. This will lead to reduced profits of these domestic 
outfits, which may reduce their operations especially in the less profitable rural areas. 
                                                 
179 International Lawyers and Economists against Poverty (ILEAP), “ African Financial Services Trade and Negotiations” Workshop 
Paper, Post- July 2004 African Strategies for Bilateral and MultiLateral Trade Negotiations, November 10-12, 2004, Nairobi, Kenya. 
180 Stichele, M.V., (18 May 2006), Comments and assessment on the Plurilateral GATS request on financial services: Senior 
Researcher, SOMO 
181 See 180 above 
182 Stichele, M.V., (18 May 2006), Comments and assessment on the Plurilateral GATS request on financial services: Senior 
Researcher, SOMO 
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Eventual shutting down of the least profitable domestic financial service providers may 
be inevitable.  
Alternatively, foreign suppliers of financial services, who are driven solely by a profit 
motive, are highly likely to leave out rural areas or small to medium scale agents with 
detrimental effects to the economy. The withdrawal of banking services from the rural 
areas by domestic financial services providers, due to increased competition from the 
foreign banks will disrupt rural agricultural economies. This will have adverse effects on 
the African economies, whose economic mainstay is agriculture. The agricultural 
economy in some African countries like Kenya is already reeling under the effects of the 
collapse of the co-operative sector, which was previously the most dependable source of 
credit due to its low interest rates and timely loan facilities. The township traders unable 
to bank their earnings have become an easy target for criminals.183  
The role of GATS in the comprehensive development framework of most African 
countries is not clear i.e. poverty reduction through growth is not very clear neither are 
financial corporate responsibility initiatives. Increased competition is likely to reinforce 
and move financial industry towards high profit, concentration and consolidation. In this 
case, if government wishes to provide support to national policies and maintain its 
presence, fiscal initiatives rather than outright exclusion of Foreign Service providers 
could be considered. The abuse side of the market may not always hold given that both 
domestic and foreign suppliers and the openness of the market to the new entrants could 
minimize this. Government could also deploy competition policies to ensure fair 
competition.184
Although the liberalization of financial services has the potential to improve efficiency in 
the financial industry and economy, the experiences of African countries tend to show 
that there is a lot more at stake than increased efficiency, choice of products and access to 
capital. Since GATS has no rules to govern foreign firms’ activities, these firms often 
                                                 
183 Stichele, M.V., (18 May 2006), Comments and assessment on the Plurilateral GATS request on financial services: Senior 
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184 SOMO, Challenges for the South in the WTO Negotiations on Services, 2www.somo.nl/somo_ned/projecten/Challenges.pdf
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dominate the most lucrative services, thus creating a financial vacuum in non-lucrative 
areas and increasing the potential to crowd out domestic firms. Liberalization of financial 
services rarely results in the proclaimed improvement of competitiveness and efficiency 
of domestic financial technologies, especially when Foreign Service providers dominate 
the lucrative markets dealing with prime borrowers such as multinational companies. In 
such cases domestic banks are left to meet the credit needs of small to medium sized 
firms with low technology banking.185  
Liberalization of the financial services industry could contribute to widening of the 
existing gaps between the favored and the marginalized segments of population and 
regions. Foreign firms widen the gap between the rich and poor by targeting the richest 
clients, the most developed regions and the best human resource in the host country. It 
has been suggested that in sub Saharan Africa, foreign firms often rapidly take over a 
large part of the domestic financial industry and since GATS has no restriction on profit 
repatriation (GATS article XI), more profits are siphoned off from the host country to the 
parent company with little or no re-investment in the host country.186 There is a 
possibility of creating dis-intermediation of up to levels allowed by the foreign exchange 
rate exposure limit through transformation of local liabilities into foreign assets. In 
addition, these countries must spend additional and often unavailable resources for 
regulatory and supervisory measures to handle changes and risks by new financial 
firms.187  
Counter arguments to this include, weakness in the legal system to enforce claims thus 
making transactions with segments of the industry risky; lack of sufficient bankable 
economic activity or its potential that create a financial services vacuum in rural areas. 
The latter also could be addressed through fiscal incentives, rather than excluding 
Foreign Service providers.  
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The liberalization of financial services also poses substantial threats to the financial 
stability of African countries and these threats arise from: 
• New financial services, which may have a destabilizing effect on a developing 
country’s financial system188.  
• GATS Articles in support of cross border capital movements and financial 
instability by limiting governments’ restrictions on profit repatriation and capital 
flows related to committed financial services. 189 
• Vague financial prudential measures permitted by GATS that leave developing 
countries’ regulations open to challenges by WTO disputes190, and 
• GATS rules permitting restrictions on unstable capital flows and financial 
services, which are limited by many conditions, prioritize the interests of foreign 
service providers at the expense of the developing countries’ ability to deal with 
problems in their financial systems.191  
Successful opening of financial markets together with liberalization of financial trade 
requires careful sequencing. Two important actions that underpin any successful 
liberalization of financial services trade include macroeconomic stability and ability to 
regulate and supervise the financial system.  
On macro-economic stability, it is observed that a number of developing countries that 
opened up their banking systems in the last one and a half decades experienced problems 
thereafter. To the extent that there are costs associated with bank failures such as  
• Bailing out of failed banks, which impacts heavily on the government budgets 
• Worsening employment and thus lowering economic activity   
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analytical paper (May 2005) 
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However, the liberalization of financial service trade itself does not cause financial crises, 
rather it is the inadequate regulation and supervision, macroeconomic policies and 
inappropriate intervention in financial markets that increases financial problems.  
Adequate prudential regulation and supervision in needed for all financial institutions that 
act as intermediaries and manage risk if the stability of the financial sector is to be 
strengthened. The interdependence between macroeconomic and financial stability 
increases in a liberalized environment. Besides, prudent regulation and supervision helps 
improve governance of the financial institution and the detection of problems at an early 
stage thereby allowing more time to apply corrective measures. In addition, appropriate 
regulation and supervision increases the stability of the financial system.192  
It appears that financial instability, in particular during the turbulent 1997-1999, was 
larger in more open countries with higher and more liberal financial sector commitments. 
Using a robust estimation procedure, the econometric evidence weakly supports this 
view. More liberal commitments on commercial presence than on cross-border supply 
have systematically increased the likelihood of banking crises, most likely reflecting the 
short-run negative effect of increased foreign competition on the domestic financial 
services market.  At the same time, commitments biased towards cross-border supply of 
financial services have increased the risk of a currency crisis, as they are associated with 
more volatile capital flows. Hence the evidence suggests that a better resource allocation 
framework created by a more liberal financial system should be safeguarded, in particular 
in the short-run, against possible negative spillovers and international contagion by 
means of sound domestic macroeconomic and prudential policies.193
Commitments to core principles in banking for effective supervision puts liberalization 
on track as these propose the minimum standards for licensing, ownership and 
liquidation, in addition to rules and requirements for both domestic and cross border 
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activities.194 The principles carefully consistent with multilateral obligations and 
commitments, and to date many governments and central banks world over have adopted 
these standards. Apart from these standards, adequate entry and exit rules, deposit 
insurance schemes to provide safety nets, know how and technology developments, 
together with market based and international monitoring help to strengthen the financial 
sector and prepare it for internationalization of its trade. 
However, this financial sector reforms should be gradual and well sequenced given that 
building capacity and institutions to monitor the financial system is costly and takes time 
ought to be carefully considered during negotiations and strongly put forth by the African 
Countries. It should also be kept in mind by the developing countries’ negotiators that the 
developed countries should adhere to articles IV and XIX of the GATS.  
It is through GATS principles that developed countries are likely to eliminate the 
flexibility that African countries can exercise in making decisions on regulations and 
prudent measures to protect their financial systems, by targeting regulations that are 
necessary and designed to promote the development of domestic businesses and curb the 
powers multinationals when operating within the African hosts’ borders. African 
countries should insist on due respect for national policy objectives, individual level of 
development and full recognition of flexibility that is required by developing countries so 
as to ensure that the right to regulate the services sector is not undermined at all.195  
Kenya has expressed the need for a strong and transparent regulatory regime and efficient 
supervisory body before further liberalization of financial services is undertaken. 
Experience has shown that it is vital to strengthen the supporting institutional framework 
in parallel with liberalization.196  
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4.1.1 The Anticipated Negative Impact of GATS on the Financial Services Industry 
In Africa 
It is often argued that foreign financial service providers increase efficiency and improve 
the quality of the financial services in developing countries. Also, foreign banks are 
claimed to improve the allocation of savings, improve access to foreign capital, and 
provide capital in times of crisis. However, experiences show mixed results to that extend 
and the most recent research and literature gives a much more nuanced view. 
Developing countries opening up to foreign banks are faced with the following 
challenges because of the profit making strategies of foreign banks who do not really 
behave like domestic banks: 
4.1.1.1 Lack of credit to smaller domestic firms197
Foreign financial service providers first focus their, more efficient, services on rich 
clients and rich regions (‘cherry picking’). The most recent research has found that this is 
especially the case in poorer countries, while in a few more developed emerging market 
economies, foreign banks also try to make profit through broader lending.198  
However, in all countries, small and medium sized domestic companies and farmers have 
difficulties in obtaining credit from foreign banks. This restrictive lending leads to lack of 
financial support to vital sectors in many developing countries or even to stifling of a 
whole economy due to a lack of credit (‘credit crunch’) to the domestic industry as was 
the case in Mexico.199 This has been the result of the introduction of standardised credit 
evaluation systems by foreign banks, and loss of capacity to assess local enterprises, as 
well as fears of lending that is considered risky by financial analysts who assess the 
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foreign banks’ value on the stock market. Such practices stimulate the gap between rich 
and poor. 
4.1.1.1.1 Implications for Africa 
The cherry picking by the foreign financial service providers, which dominate the market 
in Africa, will lead to the predominantly poor population and the local small and medium 
size enterprises having no access to credit facilities. This means that they will be unable 
to start off or improve their farming projects and small and medium sized enterprises. 
This in turn will lead to the increase in the gap between the rich and the poor.  
4.1.1.2 The risks of negative impacts on the domestic financial industry 
The proponents of foreign financial service liberalization often indicate where 
competition by foreign banks has proved to be an incentive for local banks to improve 
their operation.200 However, actual experience also shows that some local banks have 
little chance to survive the foreign competition or acquisitions. Because foreign banks 
attract the richest clients, they leave the poorer clients to the domestic financial services. 
Although the latter are much better in serving local small companies and poorer clients, 
not all can make enough profit from such clients. Chinese statistics have shown that 80% 
of the banks’ profits come from the richest 20% of the clients.201
In addition, new international standards about capital reserves that banks need to set aside 
when providing credit (Basle II) are making foreign banks much more competitive 
because they have their own risk assessment system which local banks often do not have. 
In order to survive the foreign competition, local banks might take too many risks, which 
can result in destabilisation of a country’s banking system. Also, in order to operate well 
in new markets, foreign banks attract the best managers from local banks to the foreign 
banks. The result is that expertise goes from local to foreign banks, contrary to the claims 
                                                 
200 G. Bies, Financial liberalisation in Latin America, in Developing countries and GATS, Ed. C. Jepma & E. Kamphuis, University 
of Groningen, 2003, p. 64. 
 
201 MVS report, p. 177 
 
 104
of transfer of know how. In such cases, how much efficiency gains can be made? The 
collective request on financial services explicitly asks for the removal of discrimination 
between domestic and foreign suppliers while foreign suppliers have advantages from 
their operations abroad and the domestic financial industry might require special, but 
transparent, support to become competitive or to be able to finance poorer clients. 
4.1.1.2.1 Implications for Africa 
Domination by the Foreign Service providers will lead to the loss making or even 
collapse of the local banks. The local banks are the institutions highly likely to give better 
terms to the locals. They are also more accessible to the locals because they have 
branches in the rural areas. With their demise, the local traders and farmers in Africa will 
face lack of credit facilities. The Foreign Service providers that engage in cherry picking 
will fill the gap left by the local banks. The foreign banks are likely to make more profits 
because their rich clients are able to pay higher interest rates unlike the poorer clients of 
the local banks.   
4.1.1.3 Profits to be made in the banking sector go abroad 
Foreign ownership of banks does not only lead to other behaviour and less propensity to 
invest in the domestic economy while linking more with the international financial 
markets. It also means that a sector with potentially high profits is not developed at the 
national level and by domestic entrepreneurs. Profits made by the financial industry can 
be repatriated abroad by foreign financial services providers (Art. XI of GATS requires 
transfer of all current payments), taxes are paid to home country authorities and dividends 
paid to foreign shareholders. Profits made off rich clients in poorer countries are siphoned 
off to the home countries in the North.202
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4.1.1.3.1 Implications for Africa 
The repatriation of profits by the foreign financial service providers to their home 
countries from African countries will lead to more growth in the developed countries due 
to the investment of profits from the poorer African countries. On the other hand, the 
African financial services markets will be characterised by lack of significant growth 
since the profits of the foreign firms are not being reinvested in the African countries.  
4.1.1.4 Withdrawing if not making enough profit 
While foreign financial firms are in constant search for new markets and expand their 
business to many countries, they also withdraw from countries if they do not make 
enough profit or cannot gain large market shares.203 This has for instance been the case in 
different Latin American countries and recently in Brazil and Indonesia where foreign 
banks and insurance companies resell their business because of unprofitable business. In 
Brazil, competition with domestic banks has been tough because of the experience and 
efficiency of domestic banks (who have learned to operate in financial crises and 
developed in a large domestic market with a Central Bank making sure they can have 
enough money reserves). When foreign financial firms cannot make enough economies 
of scale and do not belong to the top 5 in their category, analysts exert pressure to 
withdraw from a country. This often leads to instability and social unrest at the financial 
service provider. It can also influence the overall provision of financial services in the 
host country, especially if foreign ownership is highly concentrated.204
4.1.1.4.1 Implications for Africa 
The effect of withdrawal of the foreign financial institutions from African countries will 
be the destabilisation of the financial services sector, especially if there is a high 
concentration of foreign firms. This instability will stem from the social unrest of the 
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customers with deposits in the withdrawing banks. If the financial institutions are listed in 
the stock exchange, their sudden withdrawal may also cause unrest in the stock market. 
Share prices are highly likely to go down with the shareholders dumping what they may 
view as non-viable shares.  
4.1.1.5 Loss of supervision and regulatory control 
Subsidiaries of foreign banks are supervised by both the home country and host country 
supervisors that imply good coordination and information exchange between the two 
authorities, which is not always the case. Because decision-making at many foreign banks 
is being centralized at the headquarters and in order to reduce costs, many foreign banks 
just establish branches in other countries.205
This is a practice that is reflected in the GATS plurilateral requests. However, branches 
are only supervised by the home country authorities and subject to foreign financial 
standards and capital requirements. Because foreign authorities do not have the same 
objectives and knowledge about the impact on the local economy domestic supervisors 
lose grip on foreign banks, which can have serious implications. 
Also, less information about a foreign bank’s operation in a country is available for the 
market, the authorities and the public because acquired or merged banks are now longer 
listed as individual banks and the information of operations per country are incorporated 
as general figures in the annual report of the internationally operating mother bank. 
Therefore, bank supervisors often prefer subsidiaries that are legally organized as a 
domestically chartered bank – which is seen by the financial industry as a restriction they 
wish to remove in the GATS negotiations.  The proponents of Financial Services 
Liberalization are not for regulation of the financial services industry, saying that Non-
discriminatory domestic regulation can have a distorting effect on trade in financial 
services. In some countries regulation may not permit specific activities or specific 
products to be offered. 
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Regulation that is unnecessarily burdensome or lacking in transparency imposes 
additional costs on business. These kinds of issues are not addressed directly by the 
GATS’ rules on market access or national treatment. Because foreign banks have global 
strategies that might be less adapted to the local needs of the host countries in which they 
operate, host country governments have less leeway in directing the development of 
domestic industries. They might have less influence in making sure that foreign banks 
integrate economic objectives of the country, let alone integrate sustainable development 
practices such as no lending to environmentally destructive projects. 
4.1.1.5.1 Implications for Africa 
Most of the African economies are fragile and therefore the financial services industry 
needs to be controlled by a regulatory body. The essence of this is to have the regulatory 
agency direct the growth of the financial services industry to ensure its relevance and 
benefit to the growth of the whole economy. Lack of regulation of the financial services 
industry may lead to its growth that is relevant and beneficial to the foreign firms. This 
will be more pronounced if there is a high concentration of foreign firms in the financial 
services industry. The regulatory agency may require that a firm keep in mind and 
integrate the economic objectives of the country. Its absence translates into the foreign 
firms tailoring their operations and strategy to the satisfaction of the companies’ profit 
motive and ignoring the overall economic goals of the African host countries.  
4.1.1.6 Additional resources needed for regulatory and supervisory measures 
The request to commit mode 3 for all financial services sectors and the requests in mode 
1 and 2 do not mention that the authorities should have all the necessary regulations and 
supervision instruments in place for the diverse financial services involved. Experience 
and research have found that risks of financial instability can only be avoided when there 
are enough institutions to monitor the financial system and regulate complex financial 
conglomerates. This is costly and takes time. Each country has its weaknesses that should 
not be exploited to its disadvantage by the private financial institutions. 
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Even in the home countries, supervision of the allfinanz conglomerates is not fully 
operational and adequate yet. The need for supervising financial conglomerates can be 
seen from the several scandals in the United States that resulted in fines of more than $ 
1.5 billion for many of the top financial conglomerates. Another example is the 
condemnations of practices by Citigroup over the last years in different countries.206
The US Federal Reserve has banned Citigroup from making major acquisitions until it 
has changed its governance.207
Citigroup is the largest bank in the world, which is likely to be a major beneficiary of the 
collective GATS request and has been part of the financial lobby in the WTO. 
Also, the international financial architecture has not been reformed so as to be able to 
prevent a new financial crisis or to act very decisively against a speculative wave; this 
leaves a heavy burden on regulation and supervision at the national level. 
4.1.1.6.1 Implications for Africa 
Most African countries do not have the resources to aptly monitor the diverse financial 
services that the foreign firms may bring into the domestic market. The set up costs for 
institutions to keep track of the new services being offered in the market are highly likely 
to be unavailable for African governments. This therefore means that the probability of 
new and complex financial conglomerates destabilising the financial industry due to lack 
of supervision is highly likely in the African economies.    
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4.1.1.7 The many financial services mentioned in the collective request require 
monitoring and regulation because they can be risky for the stability of the financial 
system
Examples of such services are: 
•Financial leasing (vii in collective GATS request): for instance the leasing of shares has 
caused serious debt problems by some customers with serious loss of savings. 
Governments in the West had to intervene to allow for more warning against the risks of 
leasing. 
•All money transmission services (viii): in times of financial crisis, governments might 
need to have a control mechanism to avoid capital flight. 
•Derivative products (x ( C ) -(D)): The key risk to derivatives trade is volatility, 
unknown spill over effects in different parts of the financial markets and the resulting 
financial instability. Derivatives are already unregulated, with limited requirements to set 
aside capital reserves when the deal goes wrong. Liberalization will make it more 
difficult to control, especially if the two parties of a deal are in different countries. While 
derivatives allow for risk mitigation, they can be used to bypass regulations by complying 
with investment rules but taking bets on prohibited assets. 
Investment banking (xi): Investment bankers promote mergers and acquisitions without 
guarantees that the new company leads to value added, while many jobs are often shed. 
The underwriting of shares does not screen the social and environmental record of 
companies that will get additional funds. The combination at banks between investment 
banking and securities advisory functions has in lead to many scandals. In the US, top 
global banks had to pay more than $ 1bn of fines during the last 3 years because of such 
scandals. 
•Asset management and pension fund management (xiii): lack of regulation in investment 
banking and securities’ trading has lead to irrational investment and a bubble in the stock 
market, and its bursting at the end of 2001. In different countries, regulators issued new 
 110
laws for pension fund managers to avoid too many losses due to too risky investment in 
shares. The plurilateral request argues that there “can be advantages” in additional 
liberalization of securities services in mode 1 and 2 for institutional investors in shares, 
such as pension funds. But there might be quite some disadvantages for financial 
instability if they are not well regulated. 
In general, foreign firms provide rich clients in poor countries with more opportunities to 
channel their money to the North and invest in Western companies. The argument that 
foreign banks will provide capital to their subsidiaries or branches in a country in a 
financial crisis has not always proven to be so in practice. 
4.1.1.7.1 Implications for Africa 
African regulatory and supervisory agencies will need a lot of resources and expertise to 
regulate the above-mentioned financial products. Lack of monitoring will be risky to the 
financial system, especially to the fragile African economies.  
4.1.1.8 Limitations in government regulation 
For the purpose of market access opening, there are a few government regulations and 
policies under attack in the collective request on financial services: monopolies, 
numerical quotas, economic needs tests (whose removal was agreed in Annex C of the 
Hong Kong declaration) and mandatory sessions. These can be measures that help the 
development of a domestic financial industry and keep financial stability in times of 
crisis. Especially the economic needs test can be useful as it depends on the situation in a 
country whether foreign financial services can lead to improvement of the economy. 
The collective requests does not go as far as the many European Unions bilateral requests 
which has long lists of governmental measures that the European Union (read: its 
financial industry) wants to be removed in each country. 
More specifically, this plurilateral request does not go as far as the GATS model for 
financial services liberalization, i.e. the “Understanding on Commitments in Financial 
 111
Services” which also requires WTO members to permit any new financial service that a 
foreign financial service provider wants to initiate, and which covers mode 4. However, if 
bilateral negotiations on financial services continue alongside the plurilateral requests, 
many governmental measures might still be targeted in a non-transparent way. 
The collective request mentions that regulators are enabled to protect stability and 
integrity of the financial system. However, many GATS rules undermine prudential 
regulations, or are not clear how much protection can be provided: 
•GATS articles promote cross-border capital movements and financial instability by 
limiting government restrictions on profit repatriation (Art. XI) and controls on capital 
flows related to committed financial services (see Articles XI.1. en XVI (footnote 8). For 
instance, Chile has been asked by the European Union to do away with its requirement 
that approval by the Central Bank is needed before dividends can be transferred abroad. 
Such a Central Bank intervention is not allowed under GATS Art. XI. Footnote 8 of 
GATS Article XVI (“Market Access”) requires that a country which makes a 
commitment in a services sector, including financial services, to allow all inflows and 
outflows of capital that is considered "essential" for (financial) services in mode 1 (e.g. e-
banking) and allow inflows "related" to mode 3. Thus, countries can only regulate the 
outflow of capital except for mode 1, if they have not already deregulated capital flows 
by liberalizing the capital account as many developing countries have done. 
4.1.1.8.1 Implications for Africa 
The limitation on government to restrict profit repatriation means that the African 
governments will not be able to control capital flows in and out of their countries even 
when the economies are susceptible to financial instability. This means that the African 
countries that have committed their financial services industry to GATS will have to 
subject their already fragile economies to financial instability that may be occasioned by 
outflows of capital.  
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4.1.1.9 GATS rules permitting restrictions on unstable capital flows and financial 
services are limited by many conditions in Art. XI.2, Art. XII  
These conditions prioritise the interests of foreign-service providers rather than the 
capacity of a developing country to deal with problems in its financial system. As no 
Emergency Safeguard Mechanism has yet been agreed, the possibility of governments to 
immediately intervene before a crisis erupts is very limited. 
4.1.1.9.1 Implications for Africa 
Even when there is a looming financial crisis, African governments that have made 
commitments under the Financial Services Agreement under GATS cannot take 
intervening measures due to the conditions laid out in Article XI2 and Article XII of the 
GATS agreement.  
4.1.1.10 Influence by the financial lobby 
The short collective requests ends with requesting transparency in “development” and 
application of laws. This is an issue that needs to be discussed in the negotiations about 
Article VI on domestic regulation and not when negotiating plurilateral of bilateral 
requests among a few WTO members. This demand for transparency comes from the 
international financial industry that wants to ensure it can lobby rule making in the host 
country before it is faced with laws to be implemented. Clearly, the European Union’s 
reason to participate in the request is following the wish of its financial industry that 
wants to expand in order to avoid the limits to growth it faces in the European Union 
markets. “For European Union financial services companies, the fast-growing emerging 
economies will become a major source of activity that will help to offset slower growth 
in the more mature financial services markets” according to the European 
Commission.208
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This is hardly a perspective in the interest of development and the constituency in 
developing countries. Even in Europe, the benefits of an ever more concentrating, 
expanding and share value driven financial industry are not clear. In some countries like 
the Netherlands, the services provided by the Dutch global financial conglomerates are 
declining and many jobs are lost (e.g. 10,000 between 2000 and 2004 at ABN Amro). 
After acquisitions or mergers abroad, they also shed jobs in the host countries. 
4.1.1.10.1 Implications for Africa 
The influence of the financial lobby in the financial services trade liberalization 
negotiations will lead to the agreements reached in negotiations being skewed towards 
favoring the Multinational financial services providers. In order to achieve growth and 
domination of the African governments, these Multinationals may favor mergers and 
alliances. As mentioned above this may lead to lose of jobs in the host (African) 
countries. This is because the Multinationals will be seeking to reduce costs and increase 
profits.   
4.1.1.11 GATS articles promote cross-border capital flows and capital account 
liberalisation209
Some articles of the GATS agreement play a role in increasing the risks of destabilising 
financial flows related to foreign financial service providers. 
GATS Art. XI.1210 does not allow countries to restrict international transfers and 
payments for current financial transactions that are related to services in sectors that were 
liberalised under the Agreement. 
That means, first of all, that a country cannot prevent profit repatriation by Foreign 
Service providers in sectors in which a country has made GATS commitments. For 
instance, the EU requests from Chile in the current financial services negotiations that 
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Chile eliminates the "restriction" that prior authorization by the Central Bank is required 
before transferring dividends from Chile abroad because this is in breach of Article XI. 
Thus, if a country has liberalised the financial sectors, foreign banks and insurance 
companies can transfer their profits abroad without reinvesting them in the country. In 
countries that have small economies and/or large foreign investors in all sectors, profit 
transfers affect negatively the balance of payments and exchange rate.211
Moreover, Art. XI.1 has a special effect in relation to financial services provided by 
foreign banks, insurers, investment bankers and asset managers which have established 
themselves in countries that made GATS commitments in these services (Mode 3). These 
financial service providers might view cross-border financial flows as "related to" or 
essential to their services in cases such as: 
•Lending in foreign currency; 
•Buying securities abroad to balance the risks in pension fund management or to increase 
the rate of return of asset management services (e.g. mutual funds) for local clients or 
insurance companies; 
• Providing investment bank services related to foreign stock exchanges (underwriting 
shares of domestic firms listed abroad) or related to foreign companies (acquisitions 
abroad); 
•  Offering international derivatives; and 
• Using international credit risk mitigation mechanisms. 
Such cross-border capital flows can go beyond current account transfers and undermine 
management of the capital account aimed at avoiding financial instability and crises. If 
certain capital account restrictions frustrate the transactions of committed services 
sectors, they could be challenged under GATS XI. In countries that have already 
liberalised their capital account, GATS commitments in certain financial sub-sector will 
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increase instable capital flows. They might also discourage reversing capital account 
liberalisation where considered necessary to avoid financial crises. Developing countries 
that keep a high level of capital control are not likely to attract foreign financial firms as 
the latter avoid unpredictable local currency convertibility and capital withdrawals.212
4.1.1.12 Market opening in financial services and its impact on international capital 
movements and financial stability 
Article XI of the GATS is intended to guarantee the primacy of IMF rules in the area of 
international capital movements. Obligations as to the liberalisation of cross-border 
transactions in the WTO are linked to the commitments to market access included in a 
country’s schedule and are designed to prevent their frustration in practice through 
restrictions on the capital transactions necessary for their fulfilment. However, the 
decoupling in the GATS of market opening for financial services from liberalisation of 
capital-account transactions generally none the less leaves substantial scope for 
connections in practice. This is most easily seen for the hypothetical example of a 
country, which enters into commitments to no limitations regarding Modes 1, 2 and 3 for 
all the activities mentioned in the Annex on Financial Services. To ensure effective 
implementation of such commitments the country would be obliged to undertake 
comprehensive liberalisation of capital-account transactions. Moreover a country whose 
commitments were made through the Understanding on Commitments in Financial 
Services would also be making an open-ended commitment to the liberalisation of such 
transactions required by its obligation to “permit financial service suppliers of any other 
Member established in its territory to offer in its territory any new financial service”.213 
Although commitments as to market opening for financial services often carry associated 
obligations as to the liberalisation of capital transaction, the country making them will 
have to depend on guesswork for the estimation of the size of the capital movements 
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which are likely to ensue.214 This means that the financial crises that are sparked off by 
capital movements cannot be anticipated. This is especially true for African countries, 
which undertake GATS commitments without establishment of strong regulatory bodies. 
They will be unable to estimate the capital movements that will be triggered by the 
foreign financial services providers. They will therefore find it difficult to anticipate and 
prevent financial crises.  
The difficulty of reaching estimates here is increased by the pace of change in the 
financial sector, which is adding to the range of possible transactions under the different 
modes of delivery of the GATS.215
GATS Article XVI (“Market Access”) commits a country to allow a number of cross-
border flows when it has opened up its market for particular (financial) services: the 
country must allow inflows and outflows of capital that are considered "essential" for 
(financial) services in mode 1 (e.g. e-banking) and allow inflows "related" to mode 3 (i.e. 
foreign services provided by firms established in the country). Thus, countries can only 
regulate the outflow of capital except for mode 1, if they have not already deregulated 
capital flows by liberalizing the capital account as many developing countries have 
done.216
So far, the interpretation and impacts of Art. XI.1 and footnote 8 of Art. XVI in relation 
to financial services are a little discussed area about which experts do not always have a 
clear answer. This is reflected in discussions that have taken place217 in the WTO about 
opening up financial services that do not have a presence in the country but rather 
provide their services from abroad (mode 1). 
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Financial “products” such as lending of all types and asset management provided by 
financial firms abroad can have a destabilizing effect because they involve cross-border 
financial flows in foreign currency. Such cross-border capital transfers could affect the 
balance of payments and the whole financial stability of a country. 
4.1.1.13 GATS articles undermine measures to deal with destabilizing capital flows 
Financial authorities need to have the capacity to carefully monitor changes in cross 
border capital flows that result from financial services liberalisation. They may want to 
take measures to prevent too much financial instability, especially in small countries 
where swift flows can have a major impact. But GATS rules do not only influence what 
cross-border capital flows are permitted; they also influence how restrictions on those 
flows are managed. 
Formally, GATS does not prevent any country from taking prudential measures to protect 
depositors, investors or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. 
Art. XI.2. States "nothing in the GATS agreement shall affect the rights and obligations 
of the members of the international Monetary Fund under the Articles of Agreement of 
the Fund". This legitimises controls over capital transactions since the IMF's articles 
continue to permit policy autonomy regarding such controls.218
These rights and obligations, however, are subject to the condition that "a member shall 
not impose restrictions on any capital transactions inconsistently with its specific 
commitments regarding such transactions". In other words, IMF rights cannot undermine 
GATS commitments.219
WTO members are allowed to not apply Art. XI.1-2. In case of serious balance of 
payment problems, 
                                                 
218 SOMO, Challenges for the South in the WTO Negotiations on Services, 200 www.somo.nl/somo_ned/projecten/Challenges.pdf
 
219 See 189 above 
 118
Art. XII allows countries to restrict their market opening in (financial) services sectors 
(financial or other services sectors) for which they made liberalisation commitments, and 
to restrict cross-border money transactions related to committed sectors. However, a 
country that invokes these restrictions is bound to fulfil a number of conditions, 
including: 
• Use criteria of non-discrimination and least-harmful effects on foreign service 
providers; 
• Be consistent with the Articles of the IMF; 
• Limit the period the measures are in place; 
• Undertake consultations with WTO members. 
Ultimately, the assessment of the IMF of the financial situation of the country determines 
whether the restriction measures are to be allowed (Art. XII.5.(e)).220
4.1.1.14 GATS articles undermine prudential measures and regulations 
The vagueness of financial prudential measures permitted by GATS, e.g. in the prudential 
carve out integrated in the GATS Annex on Financial services, leaves many developing 
countries' regulations open to challenges by WTO disputes. This uncertainty about the 
interpretation of some GATS rules could result in countries refraining from introducing 
national legislation for fear of future WTO disputes. The major problem is how, during 
the (bilateral) negotiations on financial services, some governmental measures will be 
identified as trade restrictive and be removed in the commitments or some rules will be 
allowed and considered as being prudential. The European Union bilateral requests are 
targeting many governmental measures whose interpretation is left to the power games 
and bargaining of the negotiations. These issues are very much ignored in the collective 
requests 
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Art. 2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services permits domestic regulations and 
prudential measures that protect a country against financial instability and foreign 
exchange exposure. 
This article does not define prudential measures but stipulates that such measures are 
authorised to contravene other GATS provisions ("prudential carve-out"). However, the 
article states that prudential measures should not be used to avoid market openings or 
obligations under the GATS agreement. 
These conditions attached to the prudential carve-out measures may prevent countries 
from taking measures, which, while contravening GATS commitments, are nevertheless 
the most effective for dealing with financial instability. 
The vagueness of what a prudential regulation may entail allows a WTO member to 
challenge a measure of another WTO member as being not a prudential measure, but 
rather a way to avoid GATS commitments or obligations. For instance, Western countries 
robustly challenge prudential measures by China during current negotiations and WTO 
reviews with the argument that they undermine financial services commitments.221
In case of disputes brought before the WTO, a panel must in such case decide what 
prudential measure is permitted or trade restrictive to the foreign financial industry. 
Although the GATS Annex on Financial Services (Art. 4.) specifies that a panel must 
have the financial expertise necessary for the dispute, still, central banks and other 
regulators lose their full freedom to impose the prudential regulations they see as 
essential.222
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4.1.1.14.1 Implications for Africa 
African countries will avoid disputes in the WTO due to the cost of the dispute settlement 
exercise and their lack of expertise in handling dispute settlement. African countries also 
want to avoid retaliatory measures taken by their more developed and powerful trade 
partners if they (African countries) violate any GATS provisions. Therefore they will be 
hesitant to implement the unclear financial prudential measure lest they violate the other 
GATS provisions and end up in dispute settlement at the WTO. . 
4.1.1.15 CONCLUSION 
The concrete experiences of liberalisation of financial services and the lessons learned 
from their role in financial crisis need to be at the basis of the decisions by WTO member 
states about financial services liberalisation, not the interests of the global financial 
industry. Liberalisation of financial services of developing countries needs to be gradual 
and well sequenced. The plan for instance of Malaysia to do so over a period of 10 years 
needs to be respected, and not be challenged by a collective or bilateral GATS request. 
There needs to be coordination between the trade negotiators and the institutions 
responsible for the stability of the national and international financial system, which is 
now lacking for instance in some European countries. 
The limitation of policy space due to GATS rules needs to be taken into account in the 
negotiations. In countries where the domestic financial sector needs improvement or is 
not yet capable of competing with foreign competitors, GATS articles XVI, XVII and VI 
limit the government’s ability to make this a priority. Governments can set out 
exemptions to GATS articles that would allow regulators and central banks to maintain 
their policy space. However, the negotiations on the plurilateral and bilateral requests on 
financial services will put pressure to limit these exemptions as much as possible. 
Last, but not least, there is little proof in the literature that binding liberalisation of 
services in trade agreements leads to additional investment in the committed sectors 
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5.0 CHAPTER 5 
5.1 Africa’s path in the GATS negotiations 
African countries should make informed decisions when liberalizing services under 
GATS. They should make wise decisions on which sectors to liberalize or bind and push 
for reciprocal actions from WTO members. This would be the service industries that 
enjoy little or no protection. This therefore means that the African countries that have 
little or no protection of their financial services industry should take this first step.  
Some of the specific issues that African governments could pursue in order to maximize 
its interests in International trade in services include making commitments on those 
sectors where the country itself stands to gain from transfer of technology for the benefit 
of producers and consumers, through lowering of the costs of supplying the services.   
In the medium term, there are, however, service areas that will require some restrictions 
on foreign suppliers and investors so as to allow domestic firms to restructure and prepare 
themselves to face global competition. This is the case especially in those sectors where 
there are a considerable number of domestic players already involved in the supply of the 
concerned services. Some of the sectors in Africa that are likely to benefit from such 
restricted access include financial, insurance and transport services. Some of the 
conditions could be in terms of the cadres of the labor force that should be confined to 
nationals, proportional shares that can be held by foreign investors in joint ventures for a 
given period of time, and setting aside parts of the country for the exclusive operation of 
local suppliers. A good example of the latter would be restricting provincial and district 
air transport market to local firms that is already being implemented in the country. 223
African countries’ long term plans to liberalize service provision should be characterized 
by the following underlying objectives in certain sectors and sub sectors 
• Attraction of foreign investment (employment) 
• Foster competition (efficiency) 
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• Broaden product choice and improve quality (consumer welfare) 224   
On the other hand, the other underlying objectives in undertaking limited liberalization or 
total exclusion of certain sectors or sub sectors to: 
• Prevent market congestion 
• Promote transfer of technology (joint venture requirements) 
• Prevent market disruption (phase in commitments); this would be especially 
important in the distribution services 
It is necessary for African countries to commit some service sectors but to retain some of 
the flexibility and restrictions allowed under GATS, to enable the countries to take 
advantage of the prevailing opportunities. Some of the restrictions could include transfer 
of technology and training conditions. GATS also allows developing countries to 
liberalize in a seek Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) with other partners.225  
It should be borne in mind by African countries that Articles IV and XIX of GATS 
contain special provisions reflecting the interests of the developing countries. In 
considering progressive liberalization, GATS provides that there shall be appropriate 
flexibility for developing countries (especially Least Developing Countries-LDCs) for 
opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, progressively extending 
market access in line with their development situation and, when allowing access to their 
markets to foreign service providers, attaching conditions aimed at: 
• Strengthening their domestic services capacity and its efficiency and 
competitiveness, including access to technology on a commercial basis; 
• Improving their access to distribution channels and information networks; and  
• Liberalizing market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to 
them. 
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5.2 Technical support 
An aspect of an offensive strategy that African countries can pursue aggressively is 
getting firm commitments for technical support. It is apparent that regulatory capacity is 
limited. Given that a lack of regulatory capacity is commonly seen to impede the benefits 
of liberalization and is one reason of a gradualist approach, getting a commitment to 
support regulatory capacity should be easy enough to justify. It may also be strategic to 
specifically link any pre-commitment to reform to targets in capacity building by the 
more developed countries. This will ensure that any failure on the part of the developed 
countries to deliver on the commitments to build African countries’ capacity as provided 
for in GATS Article IV will be met by failure to stick to liberalization process.226  
In the area of capacity building in Africa, market access requirements may include 
transfer of technology and managerial know how through partnerships between local 
environment firms and foreign firms, training of personnel, minimum local content 
requirement. In addition there should be  
• Ongoing support for core functions: There are certain functions that are core to 
regulatory oversight exercise that occur on a repetitive basis. These would include 
setting price controls, monitoring adherence to legislation, assessing anti-
competitive behavior and resolving disputes. These types of functions need to be 
conducted by regulatory staff and require building of in-house capacity. By 
implication, the type of technical support would include training and some in-
house support to ensure that staff is able to support the application of the theory to 
the practical case of Kenya. This type of support must be on-going because of the 
turnover of staff experienced.227 
• Once-off technical support: there are also a number of regulatory functions that 
are only performed sporadically and do not necessarily require specific in house 
regulatory capacity.228 
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• Development oriented technical assistance: this could focus on infrastructure 
development, i.e. in the telecommunication sector 
At the political level, African countries should jointly give a call for a “standstill” for any 
new commitments from their side are concerned. Such a call will be fully justified 
because African countries will need complete data to make informed assessment of the 
concessions to be made or received in the negotiations. There are other equally strong 
grounds reinforcing the assertion. The mandatory review of the trade review of the trade 
in Article XIX: 3 of GATS that has to take place prior to the negotiations have not yet 
taken place. A prior meaningful review is crucial to African countries as it expected to 
assess the extent to which the operation of GATS has fulfilled the development 
objectives and realized preferential and special treatment in favor of developing countries 
specified in various articles of GATS. Such an assessment will not be meaningful unless 
adequate and direct statistical data on trade in services are available.229
An aspect of an offensive strategy for Kenya is to insist on the issue of creation of 
adequate safeguard measures to ensure that development goals are not destroyed by 
liberalization. More importantly, safeguard provisions such as those in Articles X, XV 
and XII of WTO, which are crucial to developing countries, cannot be effectively 
operational in the absence of statistical data. Negotiations on the rules and procedures to 
be made under safeguard provisions are not yet over. In such a situation, fresh 
commitments would expose African countries to avoidable dangers and even irreparable 
damage.230   
5.3 Proposals For Special Safeguard Measures 
5.3.1 Overview 
A safeguard has been described as a mechanism that can be invoked by governments, 
under specific conditions, to impose or increase protection in order to relieve, on a 
temporary basis, difficulties or pressures that have risen as a result of liberalization 
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commitments and obligations undertaken in trade agreements. The main features of a 
temporary safeguard are that it targets a specific product or industry, is applied on an 
MFN basis, is of limited duration, and is sometimes progressively liberalized over the 
period of its application, and in some cases is subjected to demands for compensation 
from other members affected by the measure. Another key element of this type of 
measure is that increased imports resulting from the liberalization must be causing or 
threatening to cause “injury” to domestic producers of a like or directly competitive 
product.231 Examples of this safeguard can be found in GATT Article XIX, in the 
Agreement on Safeguards, in Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture and in Article 6 
of the Agreement of Textiles and Clothing. 
Historically, the existence of emergency safeguard measures in trade agreements was 
viewed as a mechanism to help persuade domestic constituencies to accept greater 
liberalization. It also provides some insurance for domestic industries fearing difficulties 
in adjusting to new competitive realities following liberalization. The main role of 
safeguard clauses is to allow officials to address opposition to liberalization by pointing 
to the availability of a mechanism to suggest that “ defensive” interests have been taken 
into account. 232
Developing countries have emphasized the need for the disciplines on EMS in the context 
of the mandated negotiations under GATS Article X. owing to its temporary nature, 
imposing a window of time for implementing necessary adjustment by local suppliers of 
services and to address employment concerns. ESM becomes a means to deflate 
opposition to liberalization while possibly allowing an opportunity for affected industries 
to restructure. The importance of ESM is based on the understanding that liberalization 
involves adjustments costs and recognizes that imperfection in factor mobility may 
negatively affect resource allocation. ESM would apply in cases where surges of imports, 
as measured by value or volume, threaten to cause injury to a domestic sector or provider. 
They would address the supply of new service or service suppliers or for expanding 
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supply (new branch or contract) for those already present in the country applying 
ESM.233
5.3.2 Proposed Special Safeguards for Africa   
It is paramount for African countries to make sure that in the GATS negotiations ESM is 
an integral part. In the services context, the initial problem is the definition of imports, 
given that there are four modes of service delivery. Mode 1, cross-border trade, does not 
pose particular conceptual difficulties because there is an “import” in the traditional sense 
and the limitation on trade can take the form of constraining the sales of foreign services 
suppliers in the foreign country. For mode 2, the “import” transaction takes place in the 
exporter’s market, and it is the customer that crosses the border to consume services 
abroad. In mode 3, the situation is even more complex since the transaction involves the 
establishment of the service supplier in the importing country. There is a dual dimension 
to the “importation” issue: the establishment of a commercial presence in a host country 
and the sales or domestic operations of the established foreign supplier. The former may 
be dealt with via a limitation on foreign investment, but the latter cannot be conceptually 
considered as an “import”. As regards mode 4, the application of the concept of “import” 
to movement of persons appears rather incongruous. It has been suggested that the use of 
an economic needs test represents a form of a safeguard measure, since it relates directly 
to the capacity of the host country to absorb the additional entry of foreign personnel.234  
Since the traditional purpose of an ESM is to provide short-term import relief to the 
domestic industry, the right to bring a complaint should be that of the “domestic 
industry.”  In the services context, the domestic industry could be composed of domestic 
service suppliers that have established a commercial presence or both. In this case, the 
question arises as to whether the term “domestic industry” should include all services 
suppliers within the territorial limits of a country or whether the locally established 
                                                 
233 Abdi N.H. (LL.D), “Assessment of EU’s interests in Exports of Services into Kenya and ESA in General under EPAs (May 2005), 
Analytical Paper on Services  
 
234 Abdi N.H. (LL.D), “Assessment of EU’s interests in Exports of Services into Kenya and ESA in General under EPAs (May 2005), 
Analytical Paper on Services  
 
 127
services suppliers of foreign companies should be excluded. If locally established Foreign 
Service suppliers are excluded, negotiators must then consider the ramifications of 
classifying their services as “imports” and thereby making them subject to whatever 
safeguard measure that is imposed. In addition, the exclusion of foreign suppliers 
established in the domestic market raises the obvious problem of national treatment.235  
If an ESM is to be negotiated, a new approach would be needed that would better reflect 
the intricacies of GATS, in particular those arising from the multiplicity of modes of 
supply; that would more appropriately relate to conditions of competition in services 
trade; and that would better balance the various interests at play. 236
Countries that have shown skepticism about the needs for a GATS ESM have repeatedly 
argued that data for services industries, particularly in developing countries, are too 
incomplete and unreliable to establish either injury or causation. As a result, any 
safeguard could be prone to abuse and could result in repeated WTO challenges.  
The data problem has implications in more than one respect, in relation to the 
implementation of the provision of GATS as well as for the periodic rounds of 
negotiations for services liberalization: for implementing emergency safeguard measures 
under Article X of GATS and presumably one criteria to justify a safeguard action would 
be an objective one based on data about the need for a safeguard, for judging injury to the 
domestic service suppliers as a result of subsidies.237
The data issue is an important not merely for liberalization process but also in terms of 
the issue of safeguards. A country seeking to apply safeguards may find itself forced to 
justify its actions by demonstrating that increased imports are responsible for causing 
injury to its domestic industry. This cannot be done without proper data. Therefore, 
before African countries undertake any more commitments, the issue of data also needs 
to be addressed, and agreement reached for collection at national levels and international 
levels and collation of service data in all four modes of supply. In the meanwhile, African 
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countries, central banks and other regulatory authorities need to undertake some studies 
of their own for national data estimations 238
Without adequate expert studies, an emergency safeguard agreement could easily create 
further imbalances; it is easy to apply such safeguards in respect of the fourth mode of 
supply (movement of natural persons), but a host of problems may arise in respect of the 
third mode (commercial presence).  
The foregoing discussions suggest that an ESM would be difficult to transpose to a 
services context. A safety valve could well support liberalization commitments by 
addressing the concerns of service providers’ with regard to opening their fledging 
service markets to outside competition. The challenge is to ensure that any ESM makes 
economic sense. One way to do this would be to require public interest criteria and to 
ensure that all stakeholders are given a voice. 
It is worth mentioning that the developed countries are against the creation of ESM in the 
services industry; therefore African countries’ fallback position would be to negotiate for 
longer timeframes for liberalization of services or invoke GATS articles that are pro 
development and flexible thus giving policy space to the African countries.  
Phased opening up, possibly complemented with measures that could smooth the 
transition to a more open environment, can allow the domestic industry to adjust to the 
new environment. It can also accommodate some issues of political economy. Mexico 
committed to a phased opening up, which included progressive market capitalization 
arrangements that could modulate the growth of foreign participation in the sector in the 
event of overly rapid foreign penetration. Mexico was permitted, under agreed 
conditions, to temporarily halt the entry of new foreign participation. In practice, the 
market caps were never reached and Mexico has subsequently liberalized its foreign entry 
fully.239
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In general, it has been recognized that a phased approach, possibly with market 
capitalization arrangements and safeguards over agreed time periods in the event of 
pronounced economic balances, may be a useful part of the GATS.240 Safeguards were 
included, for example, in NAFTA for Mexico. If adverse effects were to arise when the 
share of all commercial bank assets held by foreign-owned banks exceeded a certain 
threshold, Mexico could request consultations to limit entry. Adverse effects included 
those associated with a threat to the control of domestic payments, and to the 
independence of Mexican monetary and exchange rate policy.241 In the case of Bulgaria's 
WTO accession agreement, in return for strong commitments to market access and 
national treatment, commitments were safeguarded in order to address specific 
adjustment concerns.242 In the end, none of these provisions have been used. But there 
can be specific country experiences where it would be useful to commit through 
international agreements to a phased program of opening up over some agreed time frame 
243   
 The aforementioned discussions would be apt as a position that African countries should 
adopt in the FSTLN. Specifically, the following should guide the concerned when 
negotiating the liberalization of the financial services industry: 
• The unique situation in each country needs to dictate the pace and the path of 
liberalization most suitable to the circumstances. 
• Benefits from privatization and liberalization are not automatic; the appropriate 
preconditions need to be established through appropriate regulations, entrepreneurial and 
technological capacity building and complementary policies. 
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• Governments should have flexibility to introduce measures and regulations to 
redress any unexpected problems that may occur when undertaking liberalization 
commitments. 
• Adjustment costs to liberalization need to be taken into account.  
5.3.3 The Path that African Countries should take in Financial Services Liberalization 
under GATS 
It is useful to distinguish three types of financial liberalization, and to delineate the scope of 
each. 
• Domestic financial deregulation allows market forces to work by eliminating 
controls on lending and deposit rates and on credit allocation and, more generally, by 
reducing the role of the state in the domestic financial system. 
• Capital account liberalization removes capital controls and restrictions on the 
convertibility of currency. 
• Internationalization of financial services eliminates discrimination in treatment 
between foreign and domestic financial services providers, and removes barriers to the 
cross border provision of financial services.244 
Internationalization can help countries build more robust and efficient financial systems 
by introducing international practices and standards; by improving the quality, efficiency 
and breadth of financial services; and by allowing more stable sources of funds. Given 
the state of institutional development of many countries' financial systems, these benefits 
could be substantial. 
 
The extent of these benefits, and the costs of internationalization depend, to a great 
extent, on how it is phased in with other types of financial reform, particularly domestic 
financial deregulation and capital account liberalization. Many countries which had 
successful experiences (Argentina, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and others) opened up to 
foreign financial firms while also engaging in a process of rapid domestic deregulation 
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and, consequently, reaped substantial gains245. The experience of the EU, in particular, 
suggests that internationalization and domestic deregulation can be mutually reinforcing. 
Increased foreign entry bolsters the financial sector framework creating: a constituency 
for improved regulation and supervision; better disclosure rules; and improvements in the 
legal and regulatory framework for the provision of financial services. It also adds to the 
credibility of rules.246 These benefits of opening up to foreign entry follow from top-
down actions on the part of government, as well as from bottom-up pressures from the 
market as best international practices and experiences are introduced. 
 
The two reform processes (internationalization and domestic financial deregulation) are 
mutually reinforcing, but they are not sufficient in themselves. More than in other sectors, 
the gains and costs of internationalization depend on the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, which often needs to be adapted.247 Experience shows that it is vital to 
strengthen the supporting institutional framework in parallel with domestic deregulation 
and internationalization; this is particularly true of the regulatory and supervisory 
functions of the state but it also applies to the use of the market in disciplining financial 
institutions248 (especially through better information and greater disclosure, and 
improved standards for the governance of financial institutions). 
The need to strengthen the supporting institutional framework is even more obvious when 
it comes to capital account liberalization. Experiences in recent years have shown that 
achieving the potential gains, and avoiding the risks, of capital account liberalization 
depend to a great extent on the domestic incentive framework being in place for financial 
institutions and the strength with which regulations are enforced. The experiences in this 
volume underline the potential benefits of foreign financial institutions in stabilizing 
capital flows. Therefore, African countries should by all means ensure that strong 
supervisory and regulatory institutions in the financial services industry to ensure 
stability of the said sector. The importance of an adequate legal and incentive framework, 
including prudential regulation and supervision cannot be over emphasized. 
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 Several countries with significant foreign presence benefited from the access of these 
institutions to foreign capital during periods of economic presence. More generally, the 
studies show that foreign presence can lead to a stronger regulatory and supervisory 
framework, thus making the processes of capital account liberalization and 
internationalization mutual reinforcing.249GATS does not limit, in any way, the 
prudential measures authorities may wish to use “for the protection of investors, 
depositors, policy holders or persons whom a fiduciary duty is owed” or “to ensure the 
integrity and stability of the financial system” regardless of any other provision of GATS. 
(see further Key, 2000). Further, the GATS explicitly includes a balance of payments 
safeguard that allows the member to impose temporary restrictions that suspend its of 
commitments - on a nondiscriminatory basis - in the event of “serious balance-of- 
payments and external financial difficulties or the threat thereof.” 
Nevertheless, as a consequence of incomplete legal frameworks, a lack of the skills 
needed for financial system supervision, and poor market discipline, developing country 
authorities, and other domestic agents, may find it difficult to monitor the more complex 
financial system resulting from opening up. In these cases, which likely call for improved 
domestic measures anyhow, it can be important to improve monitoring effectiveness by 
taking additional measures. It is therefore vital for African countries to improve their 
skills base to be able to monitor the financial system and to also develop legal 
frameworks that can fully address the financial services industry and its likely changes 
due to liberalization. Adequate financial sector regulation is necessary to deal with the 
potential problem of bank failure and systemic distress.  
5.3.4 Low versus High GATS Commitments 
The Figure below shows the number of crises for low- versus high-commitments 
countries.  
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 As can be seen, when commitments are high, there appear to be twice as many crises 
compared to the situation when commitments are low, a conclusion that seems robust 
with respect to the definition of the crises (except for the EIU-broad definition of banking 
crisis, the difference is less pronounced: 24 versus 18). This seems to indicate that, if 
there is any impact of the WTO commitments on financial stability, it will be negative: 
higher commitments will be associated with a larger probability of crisis. To see whether 
this result holds, the issue will be investigated econometrically, using a variant of the 
extreme bound tests typically found in the economic growth literature.250  
Cross border trade is highly likely to lead to more volatility and a higher likelihood of a 
financial crisis than commercial presence. This is due to the frequent movement of capital 
across borders in the former as compared to the latter.251  
The OECD and countries in East Asia and Eastern Europe are found to have more liberal 
commitments, whereas Latin American and South Asian countries have lower average 
commitments. Subsequently, it was investigated whether there were any variables that 
explained a country’s choice of commitments levels. 
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Several macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth, inflation and openness, 
banking performance, size and institutional variables were found to have some 
explanatory power. 
Countries with a higher economic growth, a negative growth in the banking sector and 
with restrictive actual policies were found to have lower liberalization commitments, 
sustaining an argument of protectionism and a signaling effect of actual policies. There 
are also clear peer group effects, in the sense that countries from the same region or 
income group opt for a similar level of commitments. Finally, the contribution of these 
commitments to the occurrence of financial instability was examined. Casual evidence 
indicated that a larger number of crises occurred in high-commitments countries. This 
claim was checked by using a variant of extreme bounds tests.252 Econometric evidence 
indicates that the commitments indicators did not have a strong statistical impact on 
financial crises, although there were signs that the more liberal the commitments, the 
more likely financial stability was threatened, in line with earlier evidence on the effects 
of financial liberalization on financial fragility.253 If the commitments favored 
commercial presence (mode 3) over cross-border supply (mode 1) of financial services, 
this would tend to increase the likelihood of banking problems, but reduce the risk of a 
currency crisis. The former was explained by the negative and possibly short run effects 
of greater international competition on domestic financial institutions and the latter was 
motivated by the need for more comprehensive liberalization of capital flows under mode 
1, which could give rise to an increased risk of volatile and destabilizing capital outflows. 
Finally, the evidence suggested that countries have been successful in preventing banking 
crises if they had more restrictive banking services commitments.254 This would suggest 
that African countries that have not made deep commitments should not do so; they 
should be conservative in their liberalization approach. 
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5.3.5 A Graduated, Sequenced Approach to Financial Services Industry 
Liberalization 
In his study, Honohan analyses the effects of financial sector liberalization in Greece and 
Portugal, countries that had highly regulated financial sectors prior to the introduction of 
the EU Single Market. He stresses that these experiences are of interest to developing 
countries as these two countries were the least prosperous members of the European 
Union, and had banking systems that had much in common with those in developing 
countries. In the mid-eighties, the banking systems of both countries operated under a 
regime of high reserve requirements and binding quantitative credit controls.255 Most of 
the banks were government owned or controlled, and a large volume of doubtful and non-
performing assets had accumulated for several of them. Interest rates were also subject to 
administrative control, contributing to the net effect that banking, as a whole, was 
unprofitable and weak in its capital structure. Both countries’ financial systems operated 
behind exchange controls.256
In Greece, the structural changes started in the mid-eighties and included the lowering of 
reserve requirements and the freeing of interest rates. These changes led to significant 
entry of new banks, though only few of them were foreign. The sector continued to be 
dominated by a few state-controlled banks, with many non-performing loans and 
overvalued equity holdings.257 It was not until the 1990s that the authorities decided to 
re-capitalize these banks, but the large banks remained under state control, and only a few 
small state owned banks were privatized. For these and other reasons, Greece is a case of 
incomplete liberalization that has also led to difficulties of monetary control.258 
Nevertheless, liberalization allowed the Greek financial sector to expand and modernize 
to some degree.259
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The reforms introduced in Portugal were more drastic and successful. Changes were 
brought about progressively over a period of ten years, starting with the admission of new 
banks (foreign and domestic) in 1983. The removal of interest rate controls, credit 
ceilings and other controls (on branching, for instance) began in 1988, while privatization 
of nationalized banks started in 1989. These processes were accompanied by a 
strengthening of the legislative framework. Exchange rate controls were not abolished 
until 1993. The reforms led to significant entry into the banking sector. The role of 
foreign banks remained minor however, partly because they could not participate in the 
privatization of the large banks. Initially, net interest margins increased, but then dropped 
rather sharply. Another positive effect of the entry was increased product innovation, 
which lowered borrowing costs, especially for certain low-risk consumers, and led to a 
better-developed mortgage market.260
African countries can borrow from the Portuguese and Greek experiences of a well-
sequenced liberalization process leading to a beneficial liberalization process for the 
country. This is especially true of the Portugal scenario. It is vital that African countries 
do not take on liberalization commitments that are too deep in too short a time. The 
commitments should be few and manageable to enable monitoring and evaluation of their 
impact and to come up with measures to counter any negative effects.  
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